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ABSTRACT
Three axioms from decision theory are applied to re¯nements that select con-
nected subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The ¯rst
axiom requires all equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, i.e. each
player's strategy is an admissible optimal reply to other players' strategies.
The second axiom invokes backward induction by requiring a selected subset
to contain a sequential equilibrium. The third axiom requires a re¯nement to
be immune to embedding a game in a larger game with additional strategies
and players, provided the original players' strategies and payo®s are preserved,
viz., selected subsets must be the same as those induced by the selected sub-
sets of any larger game in which it is embedded. These axioms are satis¯ed by
re¯nements that select subsets that are stable as de¯ned by Mertens (1989).
For a game with two players, perfect information, and generic payo®s, we
prove the converse that the axioms require a selected set to be stable. In
the space of mixed strategies of minimal dimension, the stable set is unique
and consists of all admissible equilibria with the same outcome as the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium obtained by backward induction. Each other
admissible equilibrium with this outcome is the pro¯le of players' strategies
in an admissible sequential equilibrium of a larger game in which the original
game is embedded, so the third axiom requires it to be included.AXIOMATIC THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
FOR GAMES WITH TWO PLAYERS,
PERFECT INFORMATION, AND GENERIC PAYOFFS
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. Three axioms from decision theory are applied to re¯nements that select con-
nected subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The ¯rst axiom requires
all equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, i.e. each player's strategy is an admissible
optimal reply to other players' strategies. The second axiom invokes backward induction by
requiring a selected subset to contain a sequential equilibrium. The third axiom requires a
re¯nement to be immune to embedding a game in a larger game with additional strategies
and players, provided the original players' strategies and payo®s are preserved, viz., selected
subsets must be the same as those induced by the selected subsets of any larger game in
which it is embedded. These axioms are satis¯ed by re¯nements that select subsets that are
stable as de¯ned by Mertens (1989).
For a game with two players, perfect information, and generic payo®s, we prove the con-
verse that the axioms require a selected set to be stable. In the space of mixed strategies of
minimal dimension, the stable set is unique and consists of all admissible equilibria with the
same outcome as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium obtained by backward induction.
Each other admissible equilibrium with this outcome is the pro¯le of players' strategies in an
admissible sequential equilibrium of a larger game in which the original game is embedded,
so the third axiom requires it to be included.
Date: 14 February 2009.
Key words and phrases. extensive-form game, perfect information, equilibrium, re¯nement, admissibility,
backward induction, small worlds, stability.
JEL subject classi¯cation: C72.
This work was funded in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation of the United States. We
thank the outsiders in our metagame.
12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Contents
List of Figures 2
1. Introduction 3
2. Notation 4
2.1. Strategies and Expected Payo®s 4
2.2. Equilibria and Re¯nements 5
3. Axioms 5
3.1. Admissibility 5
3.2. Backward Induction 6
3.3. Small Worlds 7
3.4. Summary of the Axioms 11
4. Games with Perfect Information 11
4.1. Implications of the Axioms for PI Games 11
4.2. An Example 12
5. Notation and Properties of PI Games 14
5.1. Derivation of the Strategic Form 14
5.2. Stable Sets 15
5.3. Subgames after Deviations 15
5.4. The Pseudo-Manifold Property 17
6. Statement and Proof of the Theorem 18
6.1. Preliminary Constructions 18
6.2. A Game with Redundant Strategies 19
6.3. The Game Tree for Metagames 20
6.4. Payo®s in the Metagames 21
6.5. Equilibrium Strategies of the Outsiders 22
6.6. Final Step of the Proof 24
7. Concluding Remarks 26
Appendix A. Proof of the Pseudo-Manifold Property 28
References 36
List of Figures
1 A game ¡ with perfect information 12
2 Graph of 2's strategies in admissible equilibria over the interval of perturbations of
1's strategies between (0,0,0,1) and (0,3/4,1,0). 13
3 Game ¡ augmented with 1's redundant strategy Reconsider that with probabilities
1 ¡ ± and ± implements either Out, or In followed by the behavioral strategy bx
1 14
4 Top: A game ¡ between players 1 and 2. Bottom: The metagame obtained by
allowing player 1 to commit to the redundant strategy x(±) after rejecting D. 27AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 3
1. Introduction
Kohlberg and Mertens [12] propose that Nash's [21, 22] criterion of equilibrium in a non-
cooperative game should be re¯ned by applying principles from decision theory.1 Here we
apply three axioms from decision theory adapted to games with perfect recall. In brief, these
axioms require a re¯nement that selects connected closed subsets of equilibria to satisfy:
² Admissibility: Players' strategies are admissible optimal replies.
² Backward Induction: Selected subsets contain sequential equilibria.
² Small Worlds: Selected subsets are not a®ected by embedding the game within larger
games that preserve players' strategies and payo®s.
These are among criteria proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens [12] and Mertens [20], although
we invoke a stronger version of small worlds. Our version excludes dependence on outsiders
whose presence and actions enable new pure strategies equivalent to mixed strategies in the
original game. Small worlds excludes framing e®ects that could occur if a re¯nement were
sensitive to the wider context in which a game is embedded.
We apply these axioms to the class of games with two players, perfect information, and
generic payo®s. We prove that a re¯nement must select stable subsets of equilibria as de¯ned
by Mertens [18, 19]. Mertens establishes for general games the converse that a re¯nement
that selects stable sets satis¯es the axioms. Hence the axioms characterize stability as a
solution concept for games with two players, perfect information, and generic payo®s.2 Any
re¯nement that satis¯es admissibility and backward induction but is more restrictive than
stability must therefore violate small worlds, e.g. by restricting the class of larger games in
which a game can be embedded.
Section 2 establishes notation for Section 3, which speci¯es Axioms A (admissibility), B
(backward induction), and S (small worlds), including a precise de¯nition of embedding a
game in a larger game. The axioms are stated for general games in extensive form with
perfect recall. Section 4 summarizes implications of the axioms for games with two players,
perfect information, and generic payo®s, and provides an example. Section 5 establishes
notation for this class of games and states some useful properties, including a key technical
proposition proved in Appendix A. Section 6 states and proves the main theorem. The
proof is constructive in that each equilibrium in a stable set is shown to be induced by an
admissible sequential equilibrium of a particular larger game in extensive form with perfect
1Also see Kohlberg [11]. Hillas and Kohlberg [10] and van Damme [25] survey subsequent developments.
2In [8] we prove similarly that the axioms imply that a re¯nement selects stable sets of signaling games
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recall (but with imperfect information and nongeneric payo®s) in which the given game is
embedded. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and another example.
2. Notation
A typical game in extensive form is denoted ¡. Its speci¯cation includes a set N of players,
a game tree that has perfect recall for each player, and a real-valued payo® un(z) to each
player n at each node z in the set Z of terminal nodes of the tree. The tree can include
a speci¯ed mixed strategy of Nature. As usual, payo®s are assumed to be von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities. We assume throughout the standard epistemic conditions that the
game is common knowledge and players' rationality is common knowledge.
2.1. Strategies and Expected Payo®s. In the normal-form representation of the game,
a player's pure strategy speci¯es the action chosen at each of his information sets in the
game tree. However, outcomes are not a®ected by a strategy's actions at information sets
excluded by his previous actions. Thus it su±ces to specify a pure strategy by the terminal
nodes that are not excluded by his actions.
This speci¯cation is formalized as follows [4]. A pure strategy of a player does not exclude
a terminal node z from being reached if at each of his information sets that intersect the path
to z it chooses his unique action on that path. Alternatively, the player might randomize
over his pure strategies, or he might use a behavioral strategy that randomizes over actions
at each of his information sets.3 A randomized strategy of either kind induces a probability
distribution over the terminal nodes that are not excluded. Here we take the set Pn ½ [0;1]Z
of these probability distributions as player n's set of strategies, called his mixed strategies.4 If
pn 2 Pn then pn(z) is the probability that his actions do not exclude z, and these probabilities
uniquely determine a corresponding behavioral strategy at his information sets that his prior
actions do not exclude.
Player n's set Pn of mixed strategies is a closed convex polyhedron. Its vertices are obtained
from pro¯les of pure strategies of the normal form. Let P =
Q
n Pn be the set of pro¯les of
players' mixed strategies. Note that P depends only on the game tree and summarizes its
essential features.
3Kuhn [17] shows that these yield the same distributions of outcomes when the game has perfect recall.
A randomization over pure strategies induces a unique behavior at each information set it does not exclude,
and for every behavioral strategy there exist randomizations over pure strategies that, for each pro¯le of
others' strategies, yields the same probability distribution over terminal nodes.
4Pn is called n's set of enabling strategies in [4, 8]. Mertens [20, p. 554] introduces the technique of
mapping randomized strategies to their induced probability distributions on terminal nodes. Koller and
Megiddo [14] call them realization plans, and Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel [15] use them for e±cient
computation.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 5
If p 2 P then the probability that terminal node z is the outcome of the game is
¼(zjp) = p¤(z)
Q
n pn(z), where p¤(z) is the probability that Nature's actions do not exclude
z, because Nature and the players randomize independently. Hence player n's expected
payo® is Gn(p) =
P
z ¼(zjp)un(z). Thus the extensive-form game ¡ is summarized by the
multilinear function G : P ! RN that to each pro¯le of players' mixed strategies assigns
their expected payo®s. This summary speci¯cation is called the strategic form of the game.
2.2. Equilibria and Re¯nements. Adapting Nash's [21, 22] de¯nition, an equilibrium
of a game in strategic form is a pro¯le p 2 P of players' mixed strategies such that each
player's strategy is an optimal reply to others' strategies. That is, for each player n, Gn(p) >
Gn(p0
n;p¡n) for every p0
n 2 Pn. Note that each equilibrium by this de¯nition corresponds to a
family of equivalent equilibria, represented by either behavioral strategies or randomizations
over normal-form pure strategies, that have the same distribution over outcomes.
A re¯nement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a nonempty collection of
nonempty closed connected subsets of its equilibria. Each selected subset is called a solution.
We assume that solutions are sets because Kohlberg and Mertens [12, pp. 1015, 1019, 1029]
show that there need not exist a single equilibrium that satis¯es weaker assumptions than
the axioms invoked here. The technical requirement that a solution is connected excludes
the trivial re¯nement that always selects the set of all equilibria. If payo®s are generic then
all equilibria in a connected subset yield the same probability distribution over terminal
nodes, and thus the same paths of equilibrium play in the extensive form.5 In this case,
connectedness associates solutions with selections of probability distributions over outcomes.
3. Axioms
This section presents the three axioms. The ¯rst two invoke principles of rational deci-
sions by individual players. The third axiom requires that a re¯nement is not a®ected by
extraneous features of contexts in which a game is presented.6
3.1. Admissibility. For a game with two players, a player's strategy is admissible i® it
is not weakly dominated in terms of expected payo®s by another strategy. In this case
admissibility is the same as in decision theory. We consider games with more than two
players, however, so we assume the stronger property that a strategy is an admissible reply.
5Kreps and Wilson [16, Theorem 2]. We use here the stronger characterization in [3] that nongeneric
payo®s lie in a lower dimensional subset.
6The axioms are stated for the strategic form. They have equivalent statements using, instead of players'
polyhedra of mixed strategies, their simplices of randomizations over normal-form pure strategies.6 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
De¯nition 3.1 (Admissible Reply). A player's strategy is an admissible reply to a pro¯le
p 2 P if it is an optimal reply to each pro¯le in some sequence in the interior of P for which
p is a limit point.
An equivalent decision-theoretic speci¯cation is obtained by Blume, Brandenburger, and
Dekel [1] and Govindan and Klumpp [2]. They use randomizations over normal-form pure
strategies but their results apply also to the strategic form of a game. A player's strategy
is an admissible reply to p i® it is a lexicographically optimal reply to a representation of
other players' strategies by a lexicographic probability system ^ p0; ^ p1; ^ p2;:::, where ^ p0 = p
and the interior of P intersects the convex hull of the pro¯les ^ pk. For a game in extensive
form this condition requires that, at each information set his own strategy does not exclude,
continuation of his strategy is a lexicographically optimal reply to the pro¯le of others'
strategies in the sequence ^ pk; ^ pk+1;::: where ^ pk is the ¯rst pro¯le in the system that does
not exclude that information set from being reached.
Say that a pro¯le p 2 P of players' strategies is admissible if each player n's strategy pn
is an admissible reply to p. When there are more than two players, this is much weaker
than requiring that p results from a perfect equilibrium, which requires that the justifying
sequence in De¯nition 3.1 is the same for all players.
Axiom A (Admissibility): Each equilibrium in a solution is admissible.
3.2. Backward Induction. The second axiom invokes consistent beliefs and sequential
equilibria as de¯ned by Kreps and Wilson [16, p. 872].
De¯nition 3.2 (Consistent Beliefs). A player's belief assigns to each of his information
sets a probability distribution over the nodes at this information set. Players' beliefs are
consistent with an equilibrium if they are limits of conditional probabilities induced by a
sequence of pro¯les of completely mixed strategies converging to the equilibrium.
This de¯nition of consistent beliefs appears to depart from standard decision theory be-
cause it invokes perturbed strategies, but Kohlberg and Reny [13] show that consistency of
beliefs can be derived from primitive axioms appropriate for a frequency interpretation of
probabilities. We adhere to Kreps and Wilson [16] de¯nition of sequential equilibrium in
terms of behavioral strategies.
De¯nition 3.3 (Sequential Equilibrium). An equilibrium in behavioral strategies is sequen-
tial if there exists a pro¯le of consistent beliefs such that, conditional on a player's belief
at an information set, continuation of his behavioral strategy is an optimal reply to other
players' strategies.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 7
Govindan and Klumpp [2, Section 5] observe that a sequential equilibrium can be represented
by a lexicographic probability system. The optimality property in De¯nition 3.3 is called
sequential rationality. If continuation is required to be optimal only at his information sets
that the player's own strategy does not exclude then it is called weak sequential rationality
by Reny [23].
The second axiom requires that some equilibrium in a solution is sequential.
Axiom B (Backward Induction): Each solution contains an equilibrium implied by a se-
quential equilibrium.
That is, a solution must contain an equilibrium p such that, for some sequential equilibrium,
each pn(z) is the product of player n's behavioral probabilities of choosing his actions on the
path to z.
For the games with perfect information and generic payo®s studied later, Axiom B requires
that a solution contains a subgame-perfect equilibrium constructed by backward induction,
which is a special case of a sequential equilibrium. For more general games we interpret
sequential equilibrium as the relevant generalization of backward induction.
3.3. Small Worlds. Equilibria of a game depend only on its strategic form. The analogous
property of a re¯nement is called invariance. As in decision theory, invariance requires that
it is irrelevant whether a randomization over pure strategies is treated as an additional pure
strategy. Similarly, equilibria are not a®ected by adding dummy players, i.e. `outsiders'
whose actions do not a®ect strategies and payo®s of `insiders' who are the players in the
given game. The analogous property of a re¯nement is called `small worlds' by Mertens [20].
This property too is familiar in decision theory where one excludes dependence on payo®-
irrelevant events (Savage [24]). When invariance and small worlds are adopted as axioms,
they require that a re¯nement is not a®ected by two particular presentation e®ects, i.e.
embeddings of the given game in larger games with redundant pure strategies or dummy
players.
The axiom adopted here excludes a re¯nement from depending on more general presen-
tation e®ects. We use the same name, small worlds, but consider more general embeddings.
For notational simplicity, we use the strategic form of a game to state the axiom. Thus, as
in Section 2, a game ¡ is summarized by a multilinear function G : P ! RN that to each
pro¯le of players' mixed strategies assigns expected payo®s to the players in N.
As mentioned, the purpose of the axiom is to prevent re¯nements from depending on
wider contexts in which a game is played, provided a context does not alter players' feasible
strategies and payo®s. By a context we mean here a `larger' game ~ G : ~ P £ Po ! RN[o in8 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
which game G is embedded, subject to certain restrictions speci¯ed below. The larger game
~ G has outsiders in a set o, in addition to insiders who are the players in N, and there can
be additional moves by Nature. Also, an insider n can have additional pure strategies in ~ G
that are not pure strategies in G.
The basic requirement is that an embedding should not alter the game among insiders,
conditional on any speci¯c strategies of outsiders. Restrictions on an embedding should
therefore ensure that outsiders' strategies are not payo®-relevant for insiders, and that in-
siders' additional pure strategies are redundant|although translation from a pure strategy
in ~ G to a mixed strategy in G might depend on outsiders' strategies.7
These restrictions have a technical formulation. There should exist a multilinear map
f : ~ P £Po ! P that is surjective and such that ~ Gn = Gn±f for each insider n. Moreover, to
exclude an embedding from enabling insiders to coordinate their strategies, f should factor
into separate multilinear maps (fn)n2N, where each component is a map fn : ~ Pn £ Po ! Pn
such that fn(¢;po) maps ~ Pn surjectively onto Pn for each mixed strategy po 2 Po of outsiders.
Admittedly, a statement of the axiom that uses this technical language could contain
unsuspected implications. However, after stating the formal de¯nition, we provide in Propo-
sition 3.5 an equivalent formulation that is more detailed and more transparent, and that
veri¯es the requisite properties. Also, Proposition 3.6 applies a precise test of whether the
axiom is correctly stated|a re¯nement that satis¯es the axiom should be immune to the
same embeddings that equilibria are.
De¯nition 3.4 (Embedding). A game ~ G : ~ P £ Po ! RN[o and a collection of multilinear
maps fn : ~ Pn £ Po ! Pn, one for each player n 2 N, embed a game G : P ! RN if
(a) for each po 2 Po, fn(¢;po) maps ~ Pn surjectively onto Pn, and
(b) ~ Gn = Gn ± f, where f = (fn)n2N.
Condition (a) ensures that embedding has no net e®ect on an insider's set of mixed strategies,
conditional on outsiders' strategies, and condition (b) ensures that there is no net e®ect on
any insider's payo®s. Proposition 3.5 below elaborates this interpretation in terms of pure
strategies.
Hereafter, if ~ G embeds G via maps f = (fn) then we say that ( ~ G;f) embeds G and that ~ G
is a metagame for G. We omit description of f for metagames in extensive form that embed
7For example, an insider might condition his choices on which actions he observes an outsider takes, but if
other insiders do not observe this outsider's actions then this is equivalent to the insider using the outsider's
actions as a randomization device. More generally, outsiders' strategies can a®ect how an insider's redundant
pure strategies in ~ G are mapped into mixed strategies in G. Proposition 3.5 below states the general form
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a game in extensive or strategic form. An elaborate example of a metagame in extensive
form that embeds a game in extensive form is constructed in proving Theorem 6.1.
Invariance uses the special case in which o and Po are singletons and each f maps pure
strategies of ~ G to equivalent pure or mixed strategies of G. Mertens' small worlds criterion
uses the special case in which ~ P = P and each fn is the projection map to Pn. In these two
cases, ~ P ¶ P, but embedding allows more general versions that are identi¯ed precisely in
Proposition 3.5 below.
A multilinear map fn : ~ Pn £ Po ! Pn is completely speci¯ed by its values at vertices of
~ Pn £ Po, which recall are images of pure strategies of the normal form. Let ~ P ±
n and P ±
o be
the sets of vertices of ~ Pn and Po, and let f±
n be the restriction of fn to ~ P ±
n £ P ±
o.
Proposition 3.5. ~ G embeds G via a collection of multilinear maps f = (fn)n2N if and only
if for each player n there exists ~ Tn µ ~ P ±
n and a bijection hn : ~ Tn ! P ±
n such that for each
(~ p±;p±
o) 2 ~ P ± £ P ±
o and ~ tn 2 ~ Tn:
(1) f±
n(~ tn;p±
o) = hn(~ tn),
(2) ~ Gn(~ p±;p±
o) = Gn(f±(~ p±;p±
o)), where f± = (f±
n)n2N.
Property (1) assures that each vertex p±
n 2 P ±
n is equivalent to some vertex ~ tn = h¡1
n (p±
n) 2 ~ Tn,
independently of the outsiders' pro¯le p±
o. Property (2) assures that players' payo®s from
vertices of G are preserved by the metagame ~ G.
Vertices in ~ P ±
n n ~ Tn are redundant because payo®s from pro¯les in
Q
n ~ Tn exactly replicate
payo®s from corresponding pro¯les in
Q
n P ±
n for the embedded game G. In particular, if
f±
n(~ p±
n;p±
o) = pn = 2 P ±
n then, conditional on p±
o, the vertex ~ p±
n is equivalent for insiders to
the mixed strategy pn in Pn. Thus, conditional on each pro¯le p±
o of outsiders' vertices,
embedding preserves the strategic form of the game among insiders.
Proof of Proposition. Suppose we have a game ~ G : ~ P £ Po ! RN[o and a collection of
multilinear maps fn : ~ Pn £ Po ! Pn, one for each n 2 N, such that conditions (1) and (2)
of the proposition are satis¯ed. Then, by condition (1) and multilinearity of fn for each n,
for each ¯xed po, fn(¢;po) is surjective because it maps the convex hull of ~ Tn onto Pn. Also,
condition (2) and multilinearity of each fn imply that ~ G = G ± f. According to De¯nition
3.4, therefore, ( ~ G;f) embeds G.
Now suppose that ( ~ G;f) embeds G. Let po be a pro¯le of completely mixed strategies for
outsiders. Because fn is multilinear it induces a linear mapping fn(¢;po) from ~ Pn to Pn that
is surjective by the de¯nition of embedding. Hence, for each p±
n 2 P ±
n there exists a vertex
~ tn(p±
n) in ~ P ±
n that is mapped to p±
n by this linear map. We claim that fn(~ tn(p±
n);p±
o) = p±
n10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
for all p±
o 2 P ±
o. Indeed, since po is in the interior of Po, we can express it as a convex
combination
P
po(p±
o)p±
o, where for each vertex p±
o, po(p±
o) > 0 is the weight on the vertex p±
0.
Then, fn(~ tn(p±
n);po) =
P
p±
o fn(~ tn(p±
n);p±
o)po(p±
o). Therefore, if fn(~ tn(p±
n);p±
o) 6= p±
n for some
p±
o then fn(~ tn(p±
n);po), which is an average of values at vertices of P ±
o, cannot be p±
n. Thus,
fn(~ tn(p±
n);p±
o) = p±
n for all p±
o. Let ~ Tn ½ ~ P ±
n be a collection comprising a di®erent vertex
~ tn(p±
n) for each p±
n 2 P ±
n and let hn be the associated bijection. De¯ne f±
n : ~ P ±
n £P ±
o ! Pn by
f±
n(~ p±
n;p±
o) = fn(~ p±
n;p±
o). Then conditions (1) and (2) of the proposition are satis¯ed. ¤
Now we apply the aforementioned test and verify that equilibria are not a®ected by em-
bedding in a metagame.
Proposition 3.6. If ( ~ G;f) embeds G then the equilibria of G are the f-images of the
equilibria of ~ G.
Proof. Suppose (~ p;po) is an equilibrium of ~ G and let p = f(~ p;po). For any insider n and his
strategy p0
n 2 Pn there exists ~ p0
n 2 ~ Pn such that fn(~ p0
n;po) = p0
n because fn(¢;po) is surjective
by condition (a) of De¯nition 3.4 an embedding. Using condition (b),
Gn(p
0
n;p¡n) = Gn(f(~ p
0
n; ~ p¡n;po)) = ~ Gn(~ p
0
n; ~ p¡n;po) 6 ~ Gn(~ p;po) = Gn(f(~ p;po)) = Gn(p);
where the inequality obtains because (~ p;po) is an equilibrium of ~ G. Hence p is an equilibrium
of G.
Conversely, suppose p is an equilibrium of G. For each n, express pn as a convex com-
bination
P
®(p±
n)p±
n of the vertices p±
n of Pn. For each n, let hn be the bijection given by
Proposition 3.5. Let ~ pn be the strategy for insider n in ~ G given by
P
®(p±
n)h¡1(p±
n). Since
fn is multilinear, by condition (1) of Proposition 3.5, fn(~ pn;¢) = pn and thus f(~ p;¢) = p.
Hence, it su±ces to show that there exists a strategy pro¯le po for outsiders such that (~ p;po)
is an equilibrium of ~ G. By ¯xing the pro¯le of insiders' strategies to be ~ p one induces a game
among outsiders. Let po be an equilibrium of this induced game among outsiders. To see
that (~ p;po) is an equilibrium of ~ G, observe that for each vertex ~ p±
n of an insider n:
~ Gn(~ p
±
n; ~ p¡n;po) = Gn(fn(~ p
±
n;po);p¡n) 6 Gn(p) = Gn(f(~ p;po)) = ~ Gn(~ p;po);
where the ¯rst and second equalities use the property f(~ p;¢) = p established above, and the
inequality obtains because p is an equilibrium of G. ¤
A corollary of Proposition 3.6 is that embedding does not introduce correlation among
insiders' strategies.
Using De¯nition 3.4 of embedding, the small worlds axiom is the following.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 11
Axiom S (Small Worlds): If ( ~ G;f) embeds G then the f-images of the solutions that a
re¯nement selects for ~ G are the solutions selected for G.
In view of Proposition 3.6, this axiom is an instance of the general principle that a re¯nement
should inherit invariance properties of equilibria.
3.4. Summary of the Axioms. We study re¯nements that are independent of embed-
dings in metagames that, for each pro¯le of outsiders' strategies, preserve the strategic form
of the game among insiders. And, we require that their solutions are closed connected
subsets of admissible equilibria that contain sequential equilibria. In particular, a solution
of a metagame must contain an admissible sequential equilibrium whose image is in the
corresponding solution of the embedded game.
Mertens [18, 19] proves for general games that stable sets of equilibria satisfy Axiom A,
Axiom B, invariance, and his version of small worlds. A modi¯cation of his proof extends
this conclusion to Axiom S.
4. Games with Perfect Information
The remainder of this paper applies Axioms A, B, and S to the class of games with two
players, perfect information, and generic payo®s. A game in this class is called a PI game
for simplicity.
In this section we summarize immediate implications of the axioms for PI games, and
describe the main theorem that is stated and proved in Section 6. We also provide a simple
example that illustrates the content of the theorem and the key property that is the focus
of the proof.
4.1. Implications of the Axioms for PI Games. A PI game has special features. It
has a unique sequential equilibrium. This is the subgame-perfect equilibrium obtained by
backward induction, and it uses only pure strategies. Moreover, this equilibrium is included
in the unique essential component [6] of the game's equilibria. Within this component is the
unique essential component of admissible equilibria.
The theorem in Section 6 shows that a re¯nement satisfying the axioms selects a unique
solution for each PI game. This solution is the entire component of admissible equilibria that
contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium. In particular, Axiom A requires that a solution
contains only admissible equilibria|which for two-player games are the weakly undominated
strategies|and Axiom B requires that the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is included
in each solution. A solution must therefore be a connected closed subset of the component
of admissible equilibria that contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium.12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
1
2
L C R
Out
In
a b a b a b
5,1
1,5 0,0 6,3 0,2 2,0 0,4
1 1 1
Figure 1. A game ¡ with perfect information
Extreme Point Pr(L j In) Pr(C j In) Pr(R j In)
L: 1 0 0
LC: .2 .8 0
CR: 0 .75 .25
R: 0 0 1
Table 1. Extreme points of 2's behavioral strategies in the component of
admissible equilibria
The remarkable aspect of Theorem 6.1 is that every equilibrium in the component of
admissible equilibria must be included in a solution. This is necessary to account for all
the metagames in which the PI game can be embedded. In other words, the theorem shows
that stability against every perturbation of players' strategies is equivalent to immunity to
embeddings in metagames, as required by Axiom S.
4.2. An Example. We use an example to illustrate what is required for a proof. Figure
1 shows an example of a PI game ¡. There are two components of its equilibria. One
component is inessential and all its equilibria are inadmissible. On the equilibrium path, 1
chooses In, then 2 chooses C, and then 1 chooses a. This equilibrium path is sustained by
1's inadmissible strategies that choose b with su±ciently high probability after 2's choice of
L. Either Axiom A or B excludes a solution from residing in this component.
The other component is essential and its equilibrium path is sustained by admissible
equilibria. It contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium in which 1 chooses Out, anticipating
that after In she would choose a after each choice by 2, which optimally for 2 is to choose
L. This component's four extreme points are identi¯ed by 2's strategies labeled L, R, CR,
LC in Table 1.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 13
0,0,0,1 0,3/4,1,0
0
.75
1.0
Prob(R)
LC
R
CR
40/57 2/3
Figure 2. Graph of 2's strategies in admissible equilibria over the interval of
perturbations of 1's strategies between (0,0,0,1) and (0,3/4,1,0).
To illustrate requirements for stability, we show examples of equilibria of nearby games
obtained by perturbing player 1's strategies. Figure 2 shows the graph of admissible equilibria
over an interval of perturbations, constructed as follows. Represent a behavioral strategy for
player 1 by a vector b1 = [b1(Out);b1(ajIn;L);b1(ajIn;C);b1(ajIn;R)] in the 4-dimensional
unit cube. Each perturbed game is obtained by assuming that for each strategy b1 player
1 might choose, what actually happens is that with arbitrarily small probability " > 0 her
choice is superseded by implementation of another strategy bx
1, where x ranges over the
interval 0 6 x 6 1 in Figure 2. To construct the ¯gure we assume that b0
1 = (0;0;0;1) and
b1
1 = (0;3=4;1;0). The ¯gure implies that, besides 2's choice of L in the subgame-perfect
equilibrium, a stable set must also include each extreme point LC, CR, and R, since each is
the limit of admissible equilibria of perturbed games.
Theorem 6.1 below shows that the axioms imply that indeed all four of 2's extreme points
and their mixtures must be included in a solution. The method of proof is to show that
if some point in the convex hull of these four extreme points is not included in a proposed
solution, then there exists a metagame (~ ¡;f) in extensive form that embeds ¡ and for which
the f-images of admissible sequential equilibria lie outside this proposed solution|thus
Axioms B and S require that the solution includes the entire convex hull.
A key step of the proof modi¯es the game ¡ by adding the redundant strategy for player
1 that is shown in Figure 3. In this expanded game, after player 1 initially rejects Out but
before committing to In, she can choose Reconsider, which implements the strategy that14 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
1
L C R
Out
bx
1
a b a b a b
5,1
1,5 0,0 6,3 0,2 2,0 0,4
1 1 1
1
2
L C R
Out
In
a b a b a b
5,1
1,5 0,0 6,3 0,2 2,0 0,4
1 1 1
Reconsider
1 − δ
δ
Figure 3. Game ¡ augmented with 1's redundant strategy Reconsider that
with probabilities 1 ¡ ± and ± implements either Out, or In followed by the
behavioral strategy bx
1
with probability 1 ¡ ± chooses Out and with probability ± chooses In and then implements
the behavioral strategy bx
1 at her information sets that follow player 2's responses to In. The
information set for player 2 indicates that he cannot know whether 1 chose In or Reconsider.
When ± is su±ciently small, in any equilibrium of the subgame that follows 1's initial rejection
of Out, player 1 must choose Reconsider with positive probability because it is nearly as
advantageous as Out. The expanded game therefore simulates the e®ect of perturbing the
strategies of player 1 (other than Out, which is her equilibrium strategy in ¡). The proof
in Section 6 also introduces outsiders whose strategies determine which behavioral strategy
bx
1 is implemented if player 1 chooses Reconsider and the outcome again rejects Out. This
behavioral strategy determines which admissible equilibrium results in the expanded game.
Player 2 is also provided options to reconsider his choices.
5. Notation and Properties of PI Games
In this section we establish notation and properties speci¯c to PI games.
We now use ¡ to denote a typical PI game. The set of players is N = f1;2g. Represent
the game tree as (X;Á), where X is the set of nodes and Á is the relation of precedence. As
before, Z ½ X is the set of terminal nodes and payo®s are given by a point u in U = RN£Z,
where un(z) is the payo® to player n 2 N at terminal node z 2 Z. We assume throughout
that payo®s are generic, i.e. u 2 U nU± where the excluded set U± is a lower-dimensional set
of payo®s derived in [3].
5.1. Derivation of the Strategic Form. For completeness, we ¯rst derive the strategic
form from the normal form of the game. Let X0 be the set of nodes where Nature moves.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 15
Assume that all of Nature's strategies have positive probability. For each player n, let Xn
be the set of nodes where player n moves. For each node x 2 Xn, let An(x) be the set of
actions available to player n at x. Assuming actions at all nodes are labeled di®erently, let
An be the set of all actions of player n. Then the set Sn of n's normal-form pure strategies
is the set of functions sn : Xn ! An such that sn(x) 2 An(x) for each x 2 Xn. Let §n be
the simplex of randomizations over Sn.
For each player n, his pure strategy sn 2 Sn, and any node y 2 X, let ¯n(y;sn) be the
probability that sn does not exclude y, i.e. ¯n(y;sn) = 1 if sn(x) = a for every (x;a) Á y such
that x 2 Xn and a 2 An(x), and otherwise ¯n(y;sn) = 0. Extend ¯n(y;¢) to a function over
n's simplex §n of randomized strategies via ¯n(y;¾n) =
P
sn2Sn ¯n(y;sn)¾n(sn). Similarly,
let ¯¤(y) be the probability that Nature does not exclude y. Then the probability that
a pro¯le s 2 S of pure strategies does not exclude y is ¯(y;s) = ¯¤(y)¯1(y;s1)¯2(y;s2).
Because Nature and players move independently, the function ¯ extends similarly to pro¯les
of randomized strategies via ¯(y;¾) = ¯¤(y)¯1(y;¾1)¯2(y;¾2). Player n's expected payo®
from a pro¯le s 2 S of players' pure strategies is
P
z2Z ¯(z;s)un(z), and from a pro¯le ¾ 2 §
of randomized strategies it is
P
z2Z ¯(z;¾)un(z).
De¯ne maps ½ = (½n)n2N where for each player n, ½n : §n ! [0;1]Z and ½n(¾n) =
(¯n(z;¾n))z2Z. Let Pn = ½n(§n) be the image of ½n and let P =
Q
n Pn. Then Pn is
the set of n's mixed strategies of the strategic form as de¯ned in Section 2. Given a pro-
¯le ¾ 2 §, if pn = ½n(¾n) for each player n then player n's payo® from ¾ is Gn(p) =
P
z2Z ¯¤(z)p1(z)p2(z)un(z) since pn(z) is the probability that n's strategy does not exclude
z. As in Section 2, the multilinear map G : P ! RN is the strategic form of ¡.
5.2. Stable Sets. Recall that for a two-player game a strategy is admissible i® it is not
weakly dominated. Also, because ¡ has perfect information and payo®s are generic, there
is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium s¤, and all equilibria in the same component as s¤
induce the same distribution of outcomes. Therefore, let §¤ be the unique component of
admissible equilibria that contains s¤. Every stable set of ¡ is contained in §¤. Moreover,
§¤ is itself stable [5]. Let P ¤ be the image of §¤ under ½, and let P ¤
n be its projection into
Pn.
5.3. Subgames after Deviations. For each node x 2 X, ¯(x;¾) is the same, say ¯¤(x),
for all ¾ 2 §¤. Let X¤ be the subset of nodes such that ¯¤(x) > 0, and for each n let
X¤
n = Xn \ X¤. Similarly, let Z¤ ½ Z be the set of terminal nodes for which ¯¤(z) > 0.
By genericity, at each node x 2 X¤
n player n chooses the same action a¤(x) 2 An(x) in all
equilibria in §¤. Therefore, for each z 2 Z¤ both players choose all their actions on the16 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
path to z with probability one, i.e. for each player n, p¤
n(z) = 1 for all p¤
n 2 P ¤
n and thus
¯¤(z) = ¯¤(z).
Given z = 2 Z¤, let x 2 X n X0 be the last node preceding z such that ¯¤(x) > 0. Then
x 2 X¤
m for some player m and z follows x by m's choice of some action a 2 Am(x), a 6= a¤(x).
In the subgame following a, if player n has no move then by genericity a is an inferior action
for m against all equilibria in P ¤ and thus p¤
m(z) = 0 and p¤
n(z) = 1 for all z following a|but
if player n does have a move following a then p¤
n(z) might di®er among equilibria in P ¤.
To summarize the preceding paragraph, for each player n and each p¤
n 2 P ¤
n, p¤
n(z) = 1 if
z 2 Z¤; p¤
n(z) = 0 if the last node preceding z = 2 Z¤ that belongs to X¤
m [ X¤
n belongs to
X¤
m; and p¤
n(z) = 1 if the last node x preceding z that belongs to X¤
m [ X¤
n belongs to X¤
m
and n has no move following m's choice a at x that leads to z. Thus the only indeterminacy
is when in the latter case player n has a move after player m chooses the non-equilibrium
action a at x. This motivates the following constructions.
Because ¡ has perfect information, each node y 2 X n Z initiates a subgame that we
denote ¡y. For each player n, let X±
n be the set of nodes y 2 X nX¤ such that the immediate
predecessor x of y belongs to X¤
n, and in the subgame ¡y that starts at y, player n has some
node where he moves. (Note that y need not belong to Xn: it merely has the property
that its predecessor belongs to X¤
m and the action there leading to y is a non-equilibrium
action.) Let X± = X±
1 [X±
2. For each y 2 X±, let Sy
n, §y
n, By
n, and P y
n be the sets of n's pure
strategies, randomizations over pure strategies, behavioral strategies, and mixed strategies
in the subgame ¡y, with ½y
n being the map from randomizations over pure strategies to mixed
strategies, and let P y = P
y
1 £ P
y
2.
Let W y;¤
m be the continuation payo® to player m at her node x 2 X¤
m preceding y when
she chooses a¤(x) and subsequent play adheres to an equilibrium in P ¤.
By construction, for each y 2 X±
n player n does not exclude y in an equilibrium p¤ 2 P ¤,
and in particular ¯n(y;p¤
n) = 1. Hence, for each p¤
n 2 P ¤
n the projection of p¤
n to the set
of z that follow y is a mixed strategy py;¤
n 2 P y
n of the subgame ¡y. Let P y;¤
n ½ P y
n be the
collection of n's mixed strategies for ¡y that are projections of n's mixed strategies in P ¤
n.
Proposition 5.1. P ¤ = P ¤
1 £P ¤
2. Moreover, for each n, the projection from P ¤
n to
Q
y2X±
n P y;¤
n
is a homeomorphism.
Proof. Given (p¤
1;p¤
2) 2 P ¤
1 £ P ¤
2, observe that for each n, p¤
n is an admissible strategy with
the property that p¤
n(z) = ¯n(z;s¤
n) for all terminal nodes z that do not succeed a node
y 2 X±
n; and in the subgame ¡y at each such y, the projection of p¤
1 to P y
n is such that player
m's continuation payo® at her node x immediately preceding y is no more than W y;¤
m byAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 17
leading play into the subgame ¡y. Thus, (p¤
1;p¤
2) is an admissible equilibrium inducing the
same outcome as s¤. Also, by de¯nition P ¤
n is a connected set of strategies that includes
s¤. Therefore, (p¤
1;p¤
2) belongs to the connected set of admissible equilibria that contains s¤.
This last set is, by de¯nition, P ¤. Hence, P ¤
1 £P ¤
2 µ P ¤; the reverse inclusion being obvious,
the ¯rst statement is proved.
As for the second statement, since strategies in P ¤
n vary only across terminal nodes that
follow some y 2 X±
n, the projection from P ¤
n to
Q
y P y;¤
n is injective. To prove that it is
surjective, take a strategy py
n in P y;¤
n for each y 2 X±
n. Construct a strategy p 2 Pn by letting
pn(z) be py
n(z) if z succeeds y 2 X±
n; otherwise let it equal ¯n(z;s¤
n). Clearly pn belongs to
P ¤
n. ¤
5.4. The Pseudo-Manifold Property. We conclude the setup by stating a key technical
property that enables the Hopf extension theorem to be invoked in the proof of Theorem
6.1.
Let Ay ½ P y£P y be the closure of the set of pairs (py;qy) of pro¯les of mixed strategies for
the subgame ¡y such that py is in the interior of P y, qy
n 2 P y;¤
n , and there exist ¸m;¸n 2 [0;1)
and a pro¯le ry
n 2 P y such that:8
(i) qy
m = (1 ¡ ¸m)py
m + ¸mry
m .
(ii) if ¸m > 0 then ry
m yields payo® W y;¤
m against qy
n in ¡y and there exists a sequence of
"'s converging to zero such that ry
m is a weakly sequentially rational strategy for m
in ¡y against beliefs induced by the corresponding sequence of n's mixed strategy
(1 ¡ ")q
y
n + "((1 ¡ ¸n)p
y
n + ¸nr
y
n):
(iii) (1 ¡ ¸n)qy
n + ¸nry
n is an admissible best reply for n against m's strategy qy
m .
Let ¼y : Ay ! P y be the projection map to the ¯rst factor. Also, let @Ay be the inverse
image of @P y under ¼y.
Proposition 5.2. (Ay;@Ay) is a pseudo-manifold with boundary and has the same dimen-
sion as P y. Moreover, the projection map ¼y : (Ay;@Ay) ! (P y;@P y) has degree one.
The proof is in Appendix A.
8An interpretation is that the pro¯le py represents players' initial beliefs about each other's strategy after
the deviation at y, and qy is the updated pro¯le obtained by anticipating that with some probabilities ¸
they will voluntarily choose strategies ry that are optimal replies to each other's initial and updated beliefs.
The conditions for m and n are asymmetric because m's voluntary part ry
m replies optimally mainly to n's
equilibrium strategy qy
n 2 Py;¤
n because only with arbitrarily small probability " will m's initial deviation at
x be followed by a second deviation by n at y or later in the subgame ¡y.18 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
6. Statement and Proof of the Theorem
Theorem 6.1. Axioms A, B, S imply that the unique solution of the strategic form of
a PI game is the component of admissible equilibria that contains the subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose ¹ P is a solution in terms of mixed strategies that is selected by a re¯nement
satisfying the axioms. Then by Axioms A and B, ¹ P is contained in P ¤. By Proposition 5.1,
it is su±cient to prove for each pair of collections, one for each player n, of (qy;¤
n )y2X±
n, with
qy;¤
n 2 P y;¤
n for each y, that there exists q 2 ¹ P whose projection for each n and y 2 X±
n is the
given qy;¤
n . For each player n and y 2 X±
n, let V y be an arbitrary neighborhood of qy;¤
n in P y
n.
We construct a metagame in which every sequential equilibrium has player n using a mixed
strategy in V y for each y 2 X±
n. Since ¹ P is a closed set, and V y is an arbitrary neighborhood
of qy;¤
n for each n and y 2 X±
n, this proves the theorem.
6.1. Preliminary Constructions. For each player n and each node y 2 X±
n, pick a mixed
strategy qy;¤
n 2 P y;¤
n . Let m be the other player. By admissibility, there exists py;¤
m in
the interior of P y
m against which qy;¤
n is a best reply, and there exists py;¤
n in the interior
of P y
n such that m's choice of a¤(x) is the only optimal reply in the continuation from x.
Therefore, (py;¤;qy;¤) 2 Ay n @Ay, where py;¤ = (py;¤
m ;py;¤
n ) and qy;¤ = (py;¤
m ;qy;¤
n ). Let Uy be
a neighborhood of (py;¤;qy;¤) that is a simplex of the same dimension as P y, is contained in
Ay n @Ay, and has a projection onto the last factor that is contained in V y.
Since ¼y has degree one, so does its restriction ¼
y
@Ay : @Ay ! @P y. De¯ne ~ ¼@Ay : @Ay !
@P y as follows: for each (py;qy) 2 @Ay ~ ¼@Ay(py;qy) is the unique point on the boundary
that belongs to the line from py through py;¤, i.e. it is the unique point in @P y of the form
¸py + (1 ¡ ¸)py;¤ with ¸ 6= 1. ~ ¼@Ay is the composition of ¼y with an \antipodal" map
from @P y to itself; thus, it is a degree-one mapping as well. Moreover it has no point of
coincidence with ¼
y
@Ay. (Ay n (Uy n @Uy);@Ay [ @Uy) is a pseudo-manifold with boundary.
Therefore, we can now construct a map ~ f
y
@Uy from @Uy to @P y with degree one such that,
using the Hopf extension theorem, we can extend the two maps ~ ¼@Ay and ~ f@Uy to a map
~ fy from Ay n (Uy n @Uy) to @P y. Finally, we can extend ~ fy to a map from Ay to P y as
follows: map (py;¤;qy;¤) to py;¤ and map all other points in Uy by linear interpolation, i.e.
~ fy(¸(py;¤;qy;¤)+(1¡¸)(py;qy)) = ¸py;¤+(1¡¸) ~ fy(py;qy) for all ¸ 2 [0;1] and (py;qy) 2 @Uy.
The only point of coincidence between ~ fy and ¼y is (py;¤;qy;¤). Extend ~ fy to map from P y£P y
to P y, denoting it still by ~ fy. Replacing ~ fy with a small perturbation of it, we can assumeAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 19
that the image of ~ fy is contained in the interior of P y and that (py;¤;qy;¤) is still the only
point of coincidence between ¼y and the restriction of ~ fy to Ay.
Choose ® > 0 such that for (py;qy) 2 P y £ P y, the distance between ~ fy(py;qy) and
@P y is strictly greater than ® and, furthermore, k ~ fy(py;qy) ¡ pyk > ® if (py;qy) 2 Ay n
(Uy n @Uy). Take simplicial subdivisions Ky
m of P y
m and Ky
n of P y
n such that @P y
m and @P y
n
are full subcomplexes and the diameter of each multisimplex Ky
m £ Ky
n of Ky ´ Ky
m £ Ky
n
is at most ®=2. Take subdivisions Ly
m and Ly
n of P y
m and P y
n such that, letting Ly be
the multisimplicial complex Ly
m £ Ly
n, for each player j, the j-th coordinate ~ f
y
j of ~ fy has
a multisimplicial approximation f
y
j from Ly £ Ly ! K
y
j. (See [6, Appendix B] for the
multisimplicial approximation theorem.) We use fy to denote f
y
1 £ f
y
2.
We emphasize two properties of the multisimplicial approximation. (1) For each j, no
vertex of Kj is the image of a vertex of L under f
y
j . (2) For (py;qy) 2 Ay, if there exists
a simplex K that contains its image under both ¼y and fy, then it belongs to Uy (and
hence qy belongs to V y). To see these two claims, observe that, since fy is a multisimplicial
approximation of ~ fy, for any point (py;qy), there exists a multisimplex ~ K that contains its
image under both ~ fy and fy; hence, kfy(py;qy)¡ ~ fy(py;qy)k 6 ®=2. Now, if a point (py;qy)
that represents a vertex of L gets mapped to a point in @P y by fy, then the distance between
~ fy(py;qy) and @P y would be at most ®=2, which is impossible, thus proving (1). As for (2), if
py and fy(py;qy) belong to a multisimplex K for (py;qy) 2 Ay, then kpy ¡fy(py;qy)k 6 ®=2,
implying that k ~ fy(py;qy) ¡ pyk 6 ®, which is impossible unless (py;qy) 2 Uy, proving (2).
Take a further polyhedral subdivision of Ly£Ly and let T y be the set of its full-dimensional
polyhedra. Let °y be the function generated by T y, i.e. a piecewise-linear convex function
that is linear on and only on each polyhedron in T y. The construction of such a function is
speci¯ed in [9, Theorem B.2].
Next we construct a family of metagames ~ ¡± in extensive form parameterized by 0 < ± < 1
that embed ¡.
6.2. A Game with Redundant Strategies. First we construct an extensive-form game
¡(±;p0), given 0 < ± < 1 and a collection p0 = (py)y2X± of mixed strategy pro¯les, where
each py 2 P y. For each player m and each non-equilibrium action a at x that leads to a
node y 2 X±
n, just after m chooses a, she has the option of reconsidering her decision. If
m revises her decision, then Nature steps in and with probability 1 ¡ ± implements m's
equilibrium action a¤(x) at x and the following continuation in the subgame following a¤(x):
For any node x0 2 X¤
m, it chooses the prescription given by the subgame-perfect equilibrium;
if x0 2 X±
m, then in the subgame ¡x0, it prescribes the mixture px0
m; and with probability ±20 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Nature continues with a, thus leading into ¡y, and implements the strategy prescribed by
py
m. If m does not revise her decision, then after n moves she makes choices in ¡y as in the
original game.9
If m chooses to play into the subgame or Nature does so, then next player n gets to move,
knowing only that play is now in the subgame ¡y, i.e. n knows that at each predecessor
x0 2 Xm of x, m chose the subgame-perfect equilibrium action a¤(x0), and then at x, m
chose a, after which possibly she revised her strategy, in which case with probability ±
Nature chose to lead play into ¡y.
Player n chooses one of his pure strategies in Sy
n in a sequential process. First, he provi-
sionally chooses some sy
n. Then he too gets to reconsider his choice, that is, he can choose
to implement sy
n or not. If he chooses to persist with sy
n then that strategy is automatically
implemented in ¡y. Or if he chooses to revise his choice then for each pure strategy ty
n 2 Sy
n
he can pick a redundant strategy that plays ty
n with probability 1 ¡ ± and with probability
± plays py
n, and in either case this mixture is also automatically implemented. As with m's
choice and revision, n's choices and revisions are not observed by m, who observes only which
nodes of the original subgame ¡x are reached.
The resulting game ¡(±;p0) has the same reduced normal form as ¡ because for either
player a revision implements a redundant strategy that with probabilities (1 ¡ ±;±) chooses
one of two continuation strategies available in ¡.
6.3. The Game Tree for Metagames. Now we describe the metagame ~ ¡± for each 0 <
± < 1. The game begins with a collection of seven outsiders o
y
0, o
y
m;i, and o
y
n;i for i = 1;2;3
for each player n and each y 2 X±
n, all of whom move simultaneously. Outsider o
y
0 chooses a
full-dimensional polyhedron T y in T y. For i = 1;3, the pure-strategy sets of outsiders o
y
m;i
and o
y
n;i are the vertex sets V y
m and V y
n of Ky
m and Ky
n, respectively. For j = m;n, outsider
o
y
j;2's pure-strategy set is a ¯nite set S
y;±
j of points in P
y
j chosen such that every point in P
y
j
is within ± of some point in S
y;±
j . For j = 1;2, a pure strategy v
y
j of o
y
j;1 corresponds to a
point p
y
j(vy
n) in P
y
j ; hence, a mixed strategy ¾
y
j;1 of o
y
j;1 induces a mixed strategy that is a
point p
y
j(¾
y
j;1) in P
y
j . Likewise, a randomized strategy ¾
y
j;2 induces a point q
y
j(¾
y
j;2) in P
y
j .
For outsiders o
y
j;1 and their choices v
y
j for j = 1;2 and y 2 X±, let p0(v0) be the collection
of strategies p
y
j(v
y
j). After each strategy pro¯le of the outsiders in which these particular
outsiders choose the pro¯le given by the v
y
j's, there ensues a copy of ¡(±;p0(v0)). In the
metagame, no insider (a player in N) is informed about choices of outsiders, so an information
9Examples of game trees induced by m's reconsideration of a deviation from her subgame-perfect strategy
are displayed in Figure 3 and in the lower panel of Figure 4.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 21
set of an insider is the union of the corresponding information sets in the games ¡(±;p0(vy)),
where the only di®erence among them is the parameter p0(v0).
6.4. Payo®s in the Metagames. Each terminal node of ¡± is a copy of a terminal node
of ¡, and the insiders' payo®s are the same as in ¡. We now describe the payo®s of the
outsiders. Fix y 2 X±. Suppose y 2 X±
n, payo®s of the y-outsiders are as follows.
The convex function °y is linear over each polyhedron T y in the subdivision and has a
unique linear extension over P y£P y denoted °
y
Ty. The payo®s of o
y
0 depend on the choices of
o
y
m;i and o
y
n;i for i = 1;2 as follows. Each pro¯le of mixed strategies of these players induces
a point (py;qy) in P y £ P y and the payo® to o
y
0 from choosing T y is °
y
Ty(py;qy).
For j = 1;2, outsider o
y
j;1 wants to mimic o
y
j;3: the payo® to o
y
j;1 if he chooses vertex v
y
j
and o
y
j;2 chooses w
y
j is 1 if v
y
j = w
y
j and zero otherwise.
For j = 1;2, the payo® of o
y
j;3 depends on all the other y-outsiders and is de¯ned as
follows. For each pure strategy T y of o
y
0, there exists a unique multisimplex Ly £ ~ Ly of
L £ L that contains it. For each pure strategy v
y
j of o
y
j;3 and each vertex w of Ly £ Ly,
de¯ne u±
j;2(T y;v
y
j;w) to be 1 if v
y
j is the image of w under the j-th coordinate f
y
j of fy and
zero otherwise. The function u±
j;2(T y;vy
m;¢) extends uniquely to a multilinear function over
P y £ P y since Ly £ ~ Ly is full-dimensional. Now when o
y
j;2 plays v
y
j, o
y
0 plays T y, and for
k = 1;2 and l = 1;2, o
y
k;l plays a mixed strategy ¾k;l, the payo® of o
y
j;2 is u±
j;2(T y;v
y
j;(p;q))
where for k = 1;2, p
y
k = p
y
k(¾k;1) and q
y
k = q
y
k(¾k;2).
Finally, we describe payo®s to the second set of y-outsiders. The ambient space of P y
m
and P y
n is the space RZy, where Zy is the set of terminal nodes of the subgame ¡y. Let
'y : RZy ! R be the function given by 'y(ry) = ¡
P
z2Zy r2
z. For each r 2 RZy, let »(r;¢) be
the a±ne approximation to 'y at r, i.e. for each r0, »(r;r0) =
P
z2Zy(¡r2
z + 2(rz ¡ r0
z)). For
outsider o
y
n;2, his payo® depends on the choices of the insiders and player o
y
n;1. His payo®s
are uniformly zero unless the play in the game has the following history. The original players
choose all the moves leading to x, player m chooses a leading to y, and then (regardless of
whether he chooses to revise his strategy or not), play leads to the subgame at y. In this case,
if o
y
n;2 chooses a pure strategy s
±;y
n;2, his payo®s are de¯ned as follows: when player n chooses
sy
n without revision, his payo® is »(s
y;±
n;2;sy
n). If player n revises his choice to the redundant
strategy that uses ty
n, then if o
y
n;1 had chosen py
n, his payo® is »(s
y;±
n;2;(1 ¡ ±)ty
n + ±py
n). Thus
o
y
n;2 wants to mimic the actual choice of n, in the sense that if the ¯nal strategy of n that
gets implemented is qy
n, then o
y
n;2's best replies are the points in Sy;±
n that are closest to qy
n
(under the l2 distance) and thus are all within ± of qy
n.22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
The payo® to outsider o
y
m;2 is more complicated because player m does not choose a
normal-form strategy in ¡y. His payo® depends on the choices of o
y
n;1, o
y
m;1 and the insiders.
His payo®s are uniformly zero unless the play of the game has the following choices: (i) o
y
n;1
chooses a vertex vy
n that does not belong to the boundary of P y
n; (ii) the original players
choose the actions at nodes preceding x that lead to x; m chooses a, which leads to y, and
then either chooses not to revise her choice or Nature's choice leads back into ¡y; (iii) player
n chooses to revise his choice, and Nature implements the py
n-part of the mixture, i.e. the
history has Nature not implementing the ty
n part (the part implemented with probability
(1 ¡ ±)). In the exceptional cases satisfying these three conditions, if o
y
m;2 chose a pure
strategy s±
m;2, then his payo® at the terminal node z is »(qy
m(s±
m;2);z)=py
n(vy
n;z)¯¤(z), where
¯¤(z) is the probability in ¡ that Nature does not exclude z and py
n(vy
n;z) is the probability
that py
n(vy
n) does not exclude z in ¡y.
The resulting game ~ ¡± is a metagame that embeds the original game ¡. As in Proposition
3.5, the players retain in ~ ¡± equivalent versions of all their strategies and payo®s available in
¡. Additional strategies obtained upon reconsideration of a choice introduce only redundant
strategies. In particular, Nature's action after m's deviation implements m's redundant
strategy that is a (1¡±;±) mixture of her subgame-perfect strategy s¤
m and this same strategy
up to x that chooses a at x and then follows with py
m(vy
m). Similarly, after n's reconsideration
rejects his provisional choice of some sy
n, Nature's action implements his redundant strategy
that is a (1 ¡ ±;±) mixture of ty
n and py
n(vy
n) in the continuation from y. Outsiders' actions
a®ect insiders' payo®s only via e®ects on the availability of these redundant strategies. Thus,
the players' have larger sets of strategies in the metagame ~ ¡± than in the original game ¡,
but only because they can opt for redundant strategies determined by outsiders' actions.
6.5. Equilibrium Strategies of the Outsiders. Axioms B and S require that any solu-
tion of the metagame ~ ¡± contains a sequential equilibrium, say ~ b± represented in behavioral
strategies, whose equivalent pro¯le of mixed strategies has an image in P that is contained
in the solution ¹ P. For each n and y 2 X±
n, use ¾
±;y
i to denote the strategy of outsider i.
For j = m;n, the strategies of outsiders (j;1) and (j;2) induce points p
±;y
j ´ pj(¾
±;y
j;1) and
~ q
±;y
j ´ qj(¾
±;y
j;2), respectively. Let p±;y = (p±;y
m ;p±;y
n ) and ~ q±;y = (~ q±;y
m ; ~ q±;y
n ). Let ®±;y
m be the
probability that m chooses not to revise her decision to play into the subgame ¡y, and let
r±;y
m 2 P y
m be the mixed strategy adopted by m after this choice. Let V ±;y
m and V ±;y
n be the
supports of the strategies of outsiders (m;3) and (n;3). Because player n observes only the
outcome of m's consideration of revising her choice of a, from his perspective, m's mixedAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 23
strategy in the subgame ¡y is the induced average
q
±;y
m ´ (1 ¡ ¯
±;y
m )p
±;y
m + ¯
±;y
m r
±;y
m ;
where
¯
±;y
m = ®
±;y
m =[(1 ¡ ®
±;y
m )± + ®
±;y
m ]:
Similarly, let q±;y
n be the mixed strategy implemented by n in the subgame ¡y.
Lemma 6.2. The equilibrium strategies of the outsiders satisfy the following properties.
(1) For j = m;n, suppose the vertices in V
±;y
j , which is the support of outsider o
y
j;3's
strategies, span a simplex K
±;y
j of Kj. Then p
±;y
j belongs to K
±;y
j .
(2) If every polyhedron in the support of ~ ¾
±;y
0 , which is outsider o
y
0's equilibrium strategy,
contains (p±;y; ~ q±;y), then for j = 1;2, the vertices in V
±;y
j span a simplex K
±;y
j that
does not have a vertex in @P
y
j ; moreover, in this case, f(p±;y; ~ q±;y) 2 K±;y
m £ K±;y
n .
(3) Every polyhedron in the support ~ ¾
±;y
0 contains (p±;y; ~ q±;y).
(4) For j = m;n, ~ q
±;y
j is within ± of q
±;y
j .
Proof of Lemma. For j = m;n, outsider o
y
j;1 wants to mimic outsider o
y
j;3. So, if the vertices
of V
±;y
j span a simplex K
±;y
j , then the payo® to o
y
j;1 from choosing a vertex w
y
j is positive if it
belongs to V
±;y
j and zero otherwise. Point (1) follows.
Let ^ L = ((Lm £ Ln) £ (~ Lm £ ~ Ln)) be the unique multisimplex that contains (p±;y; ~ q±;y)
in its interior. For each polyhedron T y in the support of o
y
0's strategy, there exists now a
full-dimensional multisimplex ¹ L of L £ L that contains T y. Obviously ¹ L has ^ L as a face.
For j = m;n, by construction, his payo® from choosing a strategy w
y
j if o
y
0 chooses such a
T y and given the strategies of the other outsiders, is positive if it is the image of a vertex of
^ L under f and zero otherwise. Also, since no vertex in @P
y
j is the image of a vertex of L, no
such vertex can be a best reply. Therefore, point (2) follows.
For each polyhedron T y of of T y, the payo® from T y is °
y
Ty(py;qy) and by construction,
°
y
Ty(py; ~ qy) 6 °(py; ~ qy) with the inequality being strict i® (py; ~ qy) does not belong to T y,
which proves (3).
Admissibility of o
y
n;2's strategy requires that it be a best reply to q±;y
n . By construction,
~ q±;y
n is within ± of q±;y
n .
As for outsider o
y
m;2, his strategy ~ qy
m has to be an admissible best reply against the equi-
librium. Let ^ ¿ be a completely mixed strategy of the others. Observe ¯rst that o
y
m;2's choice
of a reply to ^ ¿ depends only on the following: the insiders adhere to equilibrium play up to
x; at x, m chooses a leading to y and then either Nature or player m leads play to ¡y; the24 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
point that o
y
n;1's strategy induces in P y
n; the total probability that n revises his strategy in
the subgame ¡y; the actual mixed strategy for m that gets implemented in ¡y. Speci¯cally,
let (1 ¡ ^ ®y
m) be the probability under ^ ¿ of player m opting out of the subgame and let ^ ry
m
be the strategy under ^ ¿ that m employs in ¡y if he does not opt out. Let ^ ®y
n be the total
probability of n revising his choice under ^ ¿, and let ^ pm = py
m(~ ¿y
om;1). Also, let ¯i(x; ^ ¿) be the
probability that node x is enabled by insider i under the strategy ^ ¿, and let W y;±
n be the set
of vertices of Kn that do not belong to @P y
n. The expected payo® of o
y
m;2 from a strategy sy;±
m
is then ¯m(x; ^ ¿)¯n(x; ^ ¿) times
X
z2Zy
¯¤(z)
X
v
y
n2W
y;±
n
^ ¿
y
o
y
n;1(v
y
n)^ ®
y
n±p
y
n(v
y
n;z)[(1 ¡ ^ ®
y
m)±^ pm(z) + ^ ®
y
m^ r
y
m(z)]»(s
y;±
m ;z)=p
y
n(v
y
n;z)¯¤(z);
which equals
¯m(x; ^ ¿)¯n(x; ^ ¿)
X
v
y
n2W
y;±
n
¿o
y
n;1(v
y
n)^ ®
y
n±[(1 ¡ ^ ®
y
m)± + ^ ®
y
m]»(s
y;±
m ; ^ q
y
m);
where
^ q
y
m = [(1 ¡ ^ ®
y
m)±^ pm + ^ ®
y
m^ r
y
m]=[(1 ¡ ^ ®
y
m)± + ^ ®
y
m]
is the average strategy of m that is implemented in the subgame ¡y. By construction, the best
replies for o
y
m;2 against ^ ¿ are those points that are within ± of ^ qy
m. Thus if we have a sequence
of such completely mixed strategies ^ ¿ converging to our equilibrium, then the corresponding
sequence ^ qy
m converges to q±;y
m , which is the strategy of m that gets implemented in ¡y under
our equilibrium. Thus ~ q±;y
m is within ± of q±;y
m . ¤
6.6. Final Step of the Proof. Take a sequence of ±'s converging to zero and a correspond-
ing sequence of sequential equilibria ~ b± in behavioral strategies. By points (1) and (2) of
Lemma 6.2, p±;y and fy(p±;y; ~ q±;y) belong to the same multisimplex K±;y. Along a subse-
quence, this multisimplex is the same, say Ky. By point (3) of Lemma 6.2, ~ q±;y and q±;y
have the same limit, say q0;y. Let p0;y be the limit of p±;y. Then p0;y and fy(p0;y;q0;y) belong
to Ky. If we show that (p0;y;q0;y) belongs to Ay, then (p0;y;q0;y) belongs to Uy, thus q0;y
n
belongs to V y, and the theorem is proved.
Therefore all that remains is to show that (p0;y;q0;y) belongs to Ay. By point (2) of Lemma
6.2, Ky does not have a vertex in @P y; therefore, for all ±, including ± = 0, p±;y belongs to
the interior of P y. Recall that q±;y
m = (1 ¡ ¯±;y
m )p±;y
m + ¯±;y
m r±;y
m . Hence q0;y
m can be expressed as
(1 ¡ ¯0;y
m )p0;y
m + ¯0;y
m r0;y
m . Obviously q±;y
n is a best reply against q±;y
m . Therefore, q0;y
n is a best
reply against q0;y
m . For all small ±, the strategy for m of letting Nature play yields nearly
the continuation payo® W y;¤
m from choosing a¤(x) at x. Therefore, ¯0;y
m is positive only if r0;y
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yields a payo® of W y;¤
m against q0;y
n . If ¯0;y
m = 0 then all strategies in P y
n yield no more than
m's equilibrium continuation payo® W y;¤
m against q0;y
n ; and q0;y is a best reply against p0;y
m ,
which is in the interior of P y
m. Thus (p0;y;q0;y) belongs to Ay and we are done.
Suppose now that ¯0;y
m is positive. Let b±;y
m be a sequence of behavioral strategies in ¡y
corresponding to the sequence r±;y
m and let b0;y
m be its limit. For each ±, let ~ b±;"(±) be a sequence
of completely mixed behavioral strategies converging to ~ b± (the originally speci¯ed sequential
equilibrium in behavioral strategies of ~ ¡±) such that b±;y
m is a sequentially rational strategy
against the beliefs induced by the sequence.
Let S0;y
n be the set of pure strategies for n in ¡y that are best replies against q0;y
m . By
the optimality property of a sequential equilibrium, for each small ±, player n avoids choos-
ing a strategy that is not in S0;y
n both when he makes a provisional choice and then at
the node where he has an option to revise his strategy, where he would strictly prefer to
play one of the duplicates that chooses a strategy in S0;y
n with probability (1 ¡ ±). Since
these duplicates result in implementing the completely mixed strategy p±;y
n with positive
probability, for all such small ±, the beliefs in ¡y can be obtained from replacing the se-
quence ~ b±;"(±) with the corresponding sequence of the induced conditional distributions over
the strategies in S0;y
n as well as the duplicates. In terms of mixed strategies of the origi-
nal strategy space, this corresponds to a sequence (1 ¡ "(±))^ q
±;y;"(±)
n + "(±)p±;y
n where ^ q
±;y;"(±)
n
has its support in S0;y
n and converges to q±;y
n . Therefore, ^ q
±;y;"(±)
n itself can be written as
(1 ¡ ¸("(±)))q±;y
n + ¸("(±))r
±;y;"(±)
n , for a suitable sequence of ¸("(±)) converging to zero and
where the support of r
±;y;"(±)
n is contained in S0;y
n . Rewriting the sequence, we can express it
as (1¡ ^ "(±))q±;y
n + ^ "(±)(^ ¸(^ "(±))r
±;y;^ "(±)
n +(1¡ ^ ¸(^ "(±);±))p±;y
n ) for a sequence of ^ " converging to
zero and a corresponding sequence of ^ ¸("(±)). Let ^ ¸(±)r±;y
n +(1¡^ ¸(±))p±;y
n be the limit of the
sequence (^ ¸(^ "(±);±)r
±;y;^ "(±)
n +(1¡^ ¸(^ "(±);±))p±;y
n ). Then b±;y
m is sequentially rational against the
beliefs induced by the sequence (1 ¡ ^ ")q±;y
n + ^ "(^ ¸(±)r±;y
n + (1 ¡ ^ ¸(±))p±;y
n ). Taking the limit of
¸(±), r±;y
n and p±;y
n as ± goes to zero, and denoting them by ¸, r0;y
n and p0;y
n , respectively, we get
that b0;y
m is sequentially rational against the beliefs induced by (1¡")q0;y
n +"(^ ¸r0;y
n +(1¡^ ¸)p0;y
n )
for a sequence of "'s converging to zero.
It remains to prove that r0;y
n is an admissible best reply against q0;y
m if ^ ¸ > 0. Observe that
by construction, the support of r0;y
n is contained in S0;y
n , the set of strategies that are best
replies against q0;y
m . Furthermore, q0;y
m , which equals ¯0;y
m r0;y
m + (1 ¡ ¯0;y
m )p0;y
m , is completely
mixed, since p0;y
m is completely mixed: indeed, otherwise ¯0;y
m is zero, which implies that there
exists a continuum of equilibria where player m randomizes at x between his equilibrium26 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
play and choosing x followed with r0;y
m , which is impossible because ¡ is generic. Thus q0;y
m
is completely mixed, so r0;y
n is admissible, and we are done. ¤
7. Concluding Remarks
Axiom S excludes re¯nements from depending on embeddings in metagames. The motiva-
tion for this axiom is to prevent re¯nements from being sensitive to presentation e®ects. Yet
Theorem 6.1 shows that for PI games this axiom requires a solution to contain all admissible
equilibria in the same component as the subgame-perfect equilibrium. Each equilibrium in
this solution is included because it could occur as the insiders' strategies in a sequential
equilibrium of a metagame in which the PI game is embedded.
One could argue that this conclusion contradicts the motivation for the axiom since,
other than the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the admissible equilibria in the stable set are
included precisely because they are occur as sequential equilibria of a metagame, which is
a particular presentation e®ect. The implication we see is that the selection of a particular
equilibrium can stem from an associated class of embeddings, but if the PI game is speci¯ed
in isolation, without restricting the possible embeddings, then a re¯nement cannot exclude
any equilibrium in the solution. Su±ciently rich detail about how the game is embedded
might select a unique equilibrium of the game among insiders, but absent such context, one
needs more information to select any proper subset of the solution.
One could also argue that the theorem is uninteresting because all equilibria in the so-
lution of a PI game have the same outcome, namely the outcome of the subgame-perfect
equilibrium. In this view, players' strategies after one deviates are irrelevant except that they
must sustain players' incentives to stay on paths of equilibrium play. Our view is that it is
important to understand how rational behavior is conditioned by one player's interpretation
of the other's deviation, that is, by the beliefs that sustain the equilibrium in the ensuing
subgame.
To illustrate, we repeat here an example in [7] that invokes only invariance, which is a
weaker restriction than Axiom S. Figure 4 shows at the top a PI game ¡ in which players 1
and 2 alternate moves. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium each player chooses down at each
opportunity, which we represent by the pure strategy D, ignoring his subsequent choice were
the player to deviate. There is a single component of the Nash equilibria in which 1 uses D
and 2 uses any mixed strategy for which the probability of D is > 2=3. The component of
admissible equilibria requires further that 2's probability of a is zero.
Figure 4 shows at the bottom the metagame ~ ¡± in which player 1 can reject D and
then upon reconsideration choose either the redundant strategy x(±), which is a mixtureAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 27
A A
D D d d
1,0 0,2 0,4
a a
A A
D D d d
1,0 0,2
3,0
0,4
a a
x(δ)
3,0
A
0,2 0,4
a a
3,0
A A
1,0 0,2 0,4
a a
3,0
1 − δ
A A
D d d
1,0 0,2 0,4
a a
3,0
A A
D
1,0 0,2 0,4
a a
3,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2
δ
1/4
3/4
1
Figure 4. Top: A game ¡ between players 1 and 2. Bottom: The metagame
obtained by allowing player 1 to commit to the redundant strategy x(±) after
rejecting D.
(1 ¡ ±;±=4;3±=4) of D;d;a, where 0 < ± < 1, or continue into the subgame by choosing A
and then later d or a if 2 chooses A. The two information sets of player 2 indicate that 2
cannot know whether 1 chose A or x(±). The reduced normal form of the metagame is the
same as the original, since x(±) is a redundant strategy.
There is a unique sequential equilibrium in the metagame in which 1 chooses D and
2 randomizes between D and d with probabilities ®(±) and 1 ¡ ®(±), where ®(±) = [8 +
±]=[12 ¡ 3±]. This is sustained by 2's belief at his ¯rst information set that the conditional
probability that 1 chose x(±) given that she rejected D is ¯(±) = 2=[2 + ±]. By Bayes' Rule,
the conditional probability that 1 chose x(±) given that A occurred is p = 2=3.
A re¯nement that includes the sequential equilibrium of each metagame ~ ¡± must therefore
include every pro¯le (D;®(±);1¡®(±);0) as ± varies between zero and one. Since ®(0) = 2=3
and ®(1) = 1 this requires the re¯nement to select the entire component of admissible
equilibria, which is the stable set.28 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
This example illustrates that each equilibrium in the stable set is sustained by 2's belief
derived from a particular hypothesis, namely, embedding in the metagame ~ ¡± for some
particular value of the parameter ±.
Appendix A. Proof of the Pseudo-Manifold Property
This appendix proves Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.2: For each player n and node y 2 X±
n, (Ay;@Ay) is a pseudo-manifold with
boundary and has the same dimension as P y. Moreover, the projection map ¼y : (Ay;@Ay) !
(P y;@P y) has degree one.
Proof. Fix y 2 X±
n. Fix a pair T = (T y
m;T y
n) of subsets of pure strategies such that T y
n is
nonempty, while T y
m could be empty, and with the following additional properties: (i) for
each player i, the strategies in Ti span a face of P
y
i , say P
y
i (T
y
i ), and all points on this face
are admissible strategies; (ii) there exist points in P y
n(T y
n) against which the strategies in T y
m
all give a payo® of W y;¤
m and strategies in Sy
m n T y
m give no more than W y;¤
m .
If T y
m is empty then let Cn(T) be the set of points in P y;¤
n \ P y
n(T y
n); by genericity, all
other strategies yield m strictly less than W y;¤
m against every point in the relative interior of
Cn(T). If T y
m is nonempty then let Cn(T) be the set of points in Pn(T y
n) against which all
the strategies in T y
m are optimal in the subgame ¡y and yield W y;¤
m . Let ~ T y
n be the vertices
of the maximal face of P y
n(T y
n) whose interior intersects Cn(T). Using (ii) above and the
genericity of payo®s, then, there exist points in the interior of P y
n(T y
n) against which all the
strategies in P y
m yield strictly less than W y;¤
m , and hence ~ T y
n = T y
n if T y
m is empty. Let ~ T y
m be a
minimal subset of T y
m with respect to the following property: for each strategy pn 2 P y
n(~ T y
n),
the probability distribution induced by the strategies in T y
m n ~ T y
m are a±ne combinations of
those induced by strategies in ~ T y
m. By genericity of payo®s, the dimension of Cn(T) is then
cn(T) = ln(~ T y
n) ¡ j~ T y
mj, where ln(~ T y
n) is the dimension of P y
n(~ T y
n) and j~ T y
mj is zero if T y
m is
empty.
If T y
m is empty then let Xn(T y
m) be the set of points in P y
n against which all the strategies
in P y
m yield no more than W y;¤
m . If T y
m is nonempty then let ¹ T y
m be the set of strategies sy
m in
Sy
mnT y
m that are equally as good replies as strategies in T y
m against all points in Cn(T). Since
the strategies in T y
m are admissible, the set Xn(T y
m) consisting of the points qn against which
the strategies in T y
m are equally good replies, yield W y;¤
m , and are at least as good as strategies
in ¹ T y
m, has a nonempty intersection with the interior of P y
n. By genericity of payo®s, Xn(T y
m)
has dimension dn(T y
m) ´ ly
n¡ly
m(T y
m)¡1, where ly
n and ly
m(T y
m) are respectively the dimensions
of P y
n and Pm(T y
m).AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 29
Let Bn(T) be the set of points in P y
n of the form ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn, where qn 2 Xn(T y
m),
rn 2 Pn(T y
n), and ¸ > 1. Observe that if T y
m is empty then Bn(T) is P y
n. Indeed, in this case
pick a point rn in the interior of Cn(T). All strategies in P y
m yield strictly less than W y;¤
m
against rn. Therefore, for each pn 2 P y
n and each small 0 < ¸ < 1, these strategies still yield
less than W y;¤
m against (1¡¸)rn +¸pn; thus pn 2 Bn(T). The following lemma characterizes
the nature of the set Bn(T) when T y
m is nonempty. Here ly
n(T y
n) is the dimension of the face
P y
n(T y
n).
Lemma A.1. Suppose T y
m is nonempty. Bn(T) is a nonempty polyhedron of dimension
dn(T y
m) + ly
n(T y
n) ¡ cn(T). Each maximal face B0
n(T) of Bn(T) satis¯es exactly one of the
following:
(i) Its relative interior is contained in the relative interior of a maximal proper face of
P y
n.
(ii) There exists a strategy sy
m 2 ¹ T y
m such that sy
m is as good a reply against every
qn 2 Xn(T y
m) for which (1 ¡ ¸)rn + ¸qn belongs to B0
n(T) for some ¸ > 1 and
rn 2 P y
n(Tny); moreover, in this case, P y
m(T y
m) is a maximal proper face of the smallest
face of P y
m that includes the strategies T y
m and sy
m.
(iii) There exists a maximal proper face of P y
n(T y
n) such that for each qn 2 Xn(T y
m),
rn 2 P y
n(T y
n) and ¸ > 1, if ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn belongs to B0
n(T), then rn belongs to this
face; moreover in this case, letting T 0 be the vertices of this face, Cn(T) = C(T 0).
Proof of Lemma. Bn(T) is a subset of the a±ne space generated by Xn(T) and P y
n(T y
n). This
a±ne space has dimension dn(T)+ly
n(T y
n)¡cy
n(T), since the intersection of Xn(T) and P y
n(T y
n)
is exactly Cn(T). By admissibility, there exists a point qn 2 Xn(T) n @P y
n. There now exist
points pn arbitrarily close to such a qn such that ¸pn +(1¡¸)rn belongs to Xn(T) for some
0 < ¸ < 1 and rn 2 P y
n(T y
n). Clearly pn has a neighborhood in the a±ne space generated
by Xn(T) and P y
n(T y
n) that is contained entirely in Bn(T). Hence Bn(T) is nonempty and
has dimension dn(T) + ly
n(T y
n) ¡ cn(T), as asserted. We now show that Bn(T) is actually a
polyhedron whose maximal faces satisfy the properties of the lemma.
Choose a basis qn;i, i = 0;:::;dn(T) for the a±ne space spanned by Xn(T y
m) such that qn;i
belongs to Xm(T) n Cn(T)) for i 6 dn(T) ¡ cn(T) ¡ 1 and it belongs to Cn(T) otherwise.
Choose vectors qn;i for i = dn(T) + 1;:::;dn(T) + ln(T y
n) ¡ cn(T) such that the vectors qn;i
for i > dn(T) ¡ cn(T) span the a±ne space generated by P y
n(T y
n). Let ¹ Bn(T) be the set
of pairs (¸;¹) 2 Rdn(T) £ Rl
y
n(T
y
n) such that ¹ ¸ ¡ ¹ ¹ = 1, ¹ ¸ > 1, where ¹ ¸ =
P
i ¸n;i and
¹ ¹ =
P
i ¹n;i. For each (¸;¹) 2 ¹ Bn(T), let qn(¸) =
P
i6dn(T)) ¸n;iqn;i, rn(¹) =
P
i ¹n;irn;i, let
h(¸;¹) = qn(¸) ¡ rn(¸). Let ~ Bn(T) be the set of (¸;¹) such that rn(¹) and hn(¸;¹) belong30 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
to the convex cone spanned by P y
n(T y
n) and P y
n respectively (which immediately implies that
qn(¹), as a linear combination of rn(¸;¹) and hn(¸;¹) also belongs to the convex cone of
P y
n); the strategies in T y
m yield W y;¤
m against ¹ ¸¡1qn(¹) and other strategies yield no more than
W y;¤
m . Bn(T) is now the image of ~ Bn(T) under h. ~ Bn(T) and Bn(T) are now easily seen to
be polyhedra.
For a maximal proper face B0
n(T) of Bn(T), exactly one of the following holds uniformly
for all pn in the interior of B0
n(T) and for each (¸;¹) in h¡1(pn): (i) pn is on the boundary; (ii)
one or more of the strategies in ¹ T y
m is a best reply against qn(¹); (iii) rn(¹) belongs to a face of
Pn(T y
n); or (iv)
P
i ¸i = 1. For condition (i), genericity of payo®s implies that the boundary
has to be a maximal proper face. In the case of (ii) the strategies sy
m in ¹ T y
m that are now
equally good replies are such that their union with T y
m spans a face of P y
m of which Pm(T y
m) is
a maximal proper face, since otherwise the intersection of the sets where they all yield W y;¤
m
has a dimension that is at least two less than that of Xn(T y
m). As for (iii), suppose Cn(T 0) (
Cn(T), qn(¸) is in the relative interior of Xn(T y
m), ¹ ¸ ´
P
i ¸i > 1 and rn(¹) 2 @Pn(T y
n). Pick
an r¤
n in Cn(T) n Cn(T 0); q0
n ´ (1 ¡ ®)qn(¹) + ®r¤
n = (1 ¡ ®)((¹ ¸)
¡1(pn + (1 ¡ ¹ ¸)rn) + ®r¤
n
belongs to Xn(T y
m). Since r¤
n = 2 P y
n(T 0
n), we could not have a boundary point in case (iii)
if Cn(T 0) ( Cn(T). Condition (iv) implies that Bn(T) = Xn(T y
m). Let X+
n (T y
m) (resp.
X¡
n (T y
m)) be the set of points where strategies in Tm are equally good replies, are all better
than strategies in ¹ Tm, and yield at least (resp. no more than) W y;¤
m . The relative interior
of Xn(T y
m) is contained in the relative interior of their union. Moreover, each set intersects
P y
n(~ T y
n). For a point p+
n 2 X+
n (T), we can choose a point r¡
n in X¡
n (T)\Pn(~ Tn) and then some
convex combination of p+
n and r¡
n belongs to Xn(T y
m); thus p+
n 2 Bn(T). Likewise X¡
n (T) is
contained in Bn(T) as well. Since the relative interior of Xn(T y
m) is in the relative interior
of their union, we could not have that Bn(T 0) = Xn(T y
m). Thus case (iv) is impossible. ¤
We need one more lemma concerning these sets Bn(T). Let C0 be a maximal face of
C(T). Let Tn be the set of T 0
n such that P y
n(T 0
n) is a maximal proper face of P y
n(T y
n) and
Cn(T 0) = C0, where T 0 = (T y
m;T 0
n). Likewise, let Tm be the set of T 0
m's such that Pm(T y
m) is
a maximal proper face of P y
m(T 0
m) and Cn(T 0) = C0, where now T 0 = (T 0
m;T y
n). Let S0
m be
the set of strategies t0
m such that the face spanned by T y
m and t0
m equals P 0
m(T 0
m) for some
T 0
m 2 Tm. Let T be the set of T 0 of the form (T 0
m;T y
n) or (T y
m;T 0
n) for T 0
m 2 Tm and T 0
n 2 Tn.
Lemma A.2. Each Bn(T 0) is a full-dimensional subset of Bn(T); Bn(T) = [T02T Bn(T 0);
and the intersection of Bn(T 0) \ Bn(T
00) for T 0;T
00 2 T is a proper face of each. Thus, the
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Proof of Lemma. If T 0 = (T 0
m;T y
n), then dn(T 0) = dn(T) ¡ 1, cn(T 0) = cn(T) ¡ 1, and by
the previous lemma, Bn(T 0) and Bn(T) have the same dimension. If T 0 = (T y
m;T 0
n), then
dn(T 0) = dn(T), cn(T 0) = cn(T) - 1, ln(T 0
n) = ln(T y
n) ¡ 1, and again the result follows.
We now show that Bn(T) = [T0Bn(T 0). Obviously for each T 0 2 T , Bn(T 0) is contained in
Bn(T) and [T0Bn(T 0) µ Bn(T). To prove the reverse inequality, given pn 2 Bn(T) expressed
as ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn for some ¸ > 1, qn 2 Xn(T y
m) and rn 2 P y
n(T y
n), suppose there exists
t0
m 2 S0
m such that t0
m yields at least W y;¤
m against qn. Then, we claim that pn 2 Bn(T 0) for
some T 0 = (T 0
m;T y
n). For this claim, let r¤
n be a point in the interior of Cn(T). Strategies in
S0
m yield strictly less than W y;¤
m against r¤
n. For each qn(®) ´ ®r¤
n+(1¡®)qn, let v(®) be the
highest payo® from strategies t0
m 2 S0
m against qn(®). v(0) < W y;¤
m and v(1) > W y;¤
m . There
now exists 0 < ® 6 1 such that v(®) = W y;¤
m . Let t0
m be a strategy in S0
m that achieves W y;¤
m
against qn(®); then pn belongs to Bn(T 0
m;T y
n) where T 0
m is the face spanned by T y
m and t0
m.
Thus, it remains to consider the case where for this pn and any expression of pn in the
form ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn, the payo® from each t0
m 2 S0
m is strictly smaller than W y;¤
m . In this
case, we claim that Tn is nonempty. Indeed, to see this claim, suppose that Tn is empty.
Then, since C0 is a maximal proper face of Cn(T), its interior lies in the interior of P y
n(~ T y
n).
Expressing pn as ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn in Bn(T), by assumption, the payo® from every strategy
in Sy
m is smaller than W y;¤
m against qn. There now exists a point r0
n in the interior of P y
n(~ T y
n)
against which the strategies in T y
m still yield W y;¤
m but some strategy in S0
m yields a higher
payo®. Let qn(®) ´ ®r0
n + (1 ¡ ®)qn for 0 6 ® 6 1 and let v(®) be the highest payo® from
the strategies in S0
m against q®
n. v(0) < W y;¤
m < v(1) and now there exists 0 < ® < 1 such
that some strategy in S0
m yields W y;¤
m against qn(®), which by assumption is impossible, since
such a qn(®) is expressible as a convex combination of pn and a point in P y
n(T y
n). Thus Tn is
nonempty.
Since Tn is nonempty, there exists at least one maximal proper face P y
n(T 0
n) such that
Cn(T 0) = C0. And, Cn(T) is not contained in any such face. Choose now r¤
n in the interior of
Cn(T). r¤
n does not belong to any P y
n(T 0
n) for T 0
n 2 Tn. For the given pn, choose an expression
pn = ¸qn +(1¡¸)rn. We can assume without loss of generality that qn is completely mixed,
if necessary by replacing pn with a point that is arbitrarily close to it in Bn(T) and proving
that this pn now belongs to Bn(T y
m;T 0
n) for some T 0
n 2 Tn. For each 0 < ® < 1, now let
qn(®) = (1 ¡ ®)r0
n + ®qn where r0
n is some point in the interior of C0. Since qn is completely
mixed, qn(®) is in the interior of P y
n for all ®. Therefore, for each ®, there exists a unique
¸(®) > 1 such that rn(®) ´ ¸(a)qn(®) + (1 ¡ ¸(a))r¤
n belongs to the boundary of P y
n. For ®
close to zero, qn(®) is very close to r0
n, which belongs to the boundary of P y
n (as it belongs to
C0 which belongs to a face of proper face of P y
n(T y
n)). Therefore, for such ®, rn(®) belongs32 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
to a face Qy
n of P y
n that contains r0
n in in its interior (and hence also C0, by virtue of the fact
that r0
n belongs to the interior of C0). Qy
n is then a proper face of P y
n(T y
n). And, it cannot
contain r¤
n: indeed if it did then qn(®), as a convex combination of rn(®) and r¤
n, would
belong to Qy
n as well, which is impossible, since it belongs to the interior of P y
n. Thus, Qy
n
is a proper face of P y
n(T y
n) that contains C0 but not Cn(T). Let T 0
n be any maximal proper
face of P y
n(T y
n) that contains Qy
n but not Cn(T). Obviously pn now belongs to Bn(T y
m;T 0
n).
Thus, we have shown that Bn(T) µ [T0Bn(T 0) and in fact that the two sets are equal.
To show that the intersection of two sets Bn(T 0) is a face of each, it is su±cient to show
that for each Bn(T 0) every maximal proper face of Bn(T 0) either belongs to the boundary of
Bn(T) or is a maximal proper face of exactly one other Bn(T
00). Suppose T 0 = (T 0
m;T y
n) and
B0 is a maximal proper face of Bn(T 0). By the previous lemma, there are three possibilities.
Under case (i) there, B0 belongs to the boundary of Bn(T). Under case (ii), let ^ T 0
m be the
vertices of the set spanned by T 0
m and this strategy ty
m identi¯ed under (ii). Then P y
n(^ T 0
m)
has P y
m(T 0
m) as a maximal proper face and it in turn has P y
m(T y
m) as a maximal proper face.
Therefore there exists a subset T
00
m of ^ T y
m such that P y
m(T
00
m) is a maximal proper face of
P y
m(^ T 0
m) that is di®erent from P y
m(T 0
m) and that still contains P y
m(T y
m) as a maximal proper
face. Let ^ T
0 = (^ T 0
m;T y
n) and let T
00 = (T
00
m;T y
n). Then, since Cn(^ T 0) = C0, there are two
possibilities. Either Cn(T
00) = Cn(T) or Cn(T
00) = C0. In the former case, B0 belongs to
the boundary of Bn(T). In the latter case, B0 is a maximal proper face of Bn(T
00). Case
(iii) implies that for the face Pn(T
00) of Pn(T y
n) such that for every pn 2 Bn(T 0) expressed as
some ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn, rn 2 Pn(T
00
n), Cn(T
00
n) = Cn(T 0) = C0. Thus, T
00
n 2 Tn and B0 is a face
of Bn(T y
m;T
00
n). If B0
n is a face of Bn(T y
m;T 0
n), the proof is analogous to the above arguments
and hence omitted. ¤
For each T, let An(T) ´ Bn(T) £ Cn(T). Then An(T) is a polyhedron of dimension
ly
n ¡ ly
m(T y
m) + ln(T y
n) ¡ 1.
We turn now to an equivalent analysis of Pm. Again ¯x the sets (T y
m;T y
n) with the same
properties as above. Let Xm(T y
n) be the set of points in P y
m against which the strategies in
T y
n are best replies. The dimension of Xm(T y
n) is dm = lm ¡ ln(T y
n).
If T y
m is empty, let Am be the set of (pm;pm) such that pm 2 Xm(T y
n). Otherwise, let Am(T)
be the set of (pm;qm) 2 P y
m£Xm(T y
n) such that there exists ¸ > 1 such that (1¡¸)pm+¸qm
belongs to Pm(T y
m). Observe that this ¸ is unique unless pm (and hence also qm) belongs to
Pm(T y
m). The following is analogous to the previous lemma.
Lemma A.3. The set Am(T) is a convex polyhedron of dimension lm+lm(T y
m)¡ly
n(T y
n)+1.
On a maximal proper face A0
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uniformly for all (pm;qm) in A0
m: (i) pm belongs to a maximal proper face of P y
m; (ii) there
exists sn = 2 T y
n such that sn is a best reply against (pm;qm); moreover, Pn(T y
n) is a maximal
proper face of P y
n spanned by T y
n and this strategy sn; (iii) there exists a maximal proper
face of P y
m(T y
m) (which is empty if T y
m is a singleton) such that if qm = (1¡¸)pm+¸rm, then
rm belongs to this face (and if T y
m is a singleton, then qm = pm).
Lemma A.4. (p;q) belongs to Ay i® there exists T as above such that ((pm;qm);(pn;qn)) 2
Am(T) £ An(T).
Proof of Lemma. Suppose (p;q) belongs to Am(T) £ An(T) for some T. We will show that
it belongs to Ay. It is su±cient to show this when (p;q) belongs to the interior of Am(T) £
An(T), since Ay is closed. By this assumption, p belongs to the interior of P y. The support of
qn is in T y
n; the strategies in T y
n are best replies against qm; and also, there exists rn 2 Pn(T y
n),
¸n 2 (0;1] and q0
n 2 Xn(T y
m) such that q0
n = (1 ¡ ¸n)rn + ¸npn. Since the support of rn and
qn are contained in T y
n, which are all best replies against qm, point (iii) of the de¯nition of
Ay is satis¯ed. Thus there remains point (ii). If pm = qm, there is nothing more to prove.
Suppose now that qm = (1 ¡ ¸m)pm + ¸mrm for some ¸ > 0 and the support of rm is in T y
m.
Fix a point r0
n in the relative interior of Cn(T) and consider for ¯xed 0 < ± < 1 (which is to
be speci¯ed later), the sequence q(") = (1 ¡ ")qn + "((1 ¡ ±)r0
n + ±q0
n). By the construction
of Am(T), the support of rm is contained in T y
m, and the strategies T y
m are optimal against
qn and r0
n, both of which belong to Cn(T). Also they do equally well against q0
n and hence
against qn(") for all ". If sy
n belongs to ¹ T y
m, then it does as well as strategies in T y
m against
both qn and r0
n but no better against q0
n. Finally, if sy
n does not belong to ¹ T y
m, then it does
no better than T y
m against qn and strictly worse than those strategies against r0
n, and thus
worse against qn(") for small " if ± is su±ciently close to 1. Thus we have shown that (p;q)
belongs to Ay.
Suppose now that (p;q) belongs to Ay. We will show that it belongs to Am(T) £ An(T)
for some T. Again, it is su±cient to assume that p is in the interior of P y and (p;q)
satis¯es the conditions (i)-(iii) of the de¯nition of Ay. Let qm = (1 ¡ ¸m)pm + ¸mrm and let
q0
n = (1 ¡ ¸n)pn + ¸nrn. Let Tn be the support of qn if ¸n = 0 and otherwise let it be the
union of the supports of qn and rn. If ¸m = 0 then letting Tm be the empty set we see that
(p;q) belongs to Am(T) £ An(T).
Suppose now that ¸m 6= 0. Let Tm be vertices of the face of P y
m that contains rm in its
interior. Since (1 ¡ ¸n)qn + ¸nrn is a best reply against (1 ¡ ¸m)pm + ¸mrm, which, like
pm is in the interior of P y
m, it is an admissible best reply against that strategy and thus
(pm;qm) 2 Am(T). We now have to show that (pn;qn) belongs to An(T). Let qn(") ´34 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
(1 ¡ ")qn + "((1 ¡ ¸n)pn + ¸nrn) be a sequence satisfying condition (ii). Then by weak
sequential rationality, the strategies in T y
m are best replies against qn and thus qn belongs to
Cn(T). Thus there remains to show that pn belongs to An(T). To do this we need to show
that there exists a point of the form ¸0
nr0
n + (1 ¡ ¸0
n)pn against which the strategies in T y
m
yield W y;¤
m and are at least as good replies as those in ¹ T y
m. In fact it is su±cient to show
a weaker statement, one obtained by relaxing the requirement that the common payo® to
the strategies in T y
m is W y;¤
m . Indeed, suppose the common payo® is some w < W y;¤
m (the
argument for the other case being analogous) then we can ¯nd a point r
00
n in P y
n(~ T y
n) where
the strategies in T y
m [ ¹ T y
m all yield the same payo® and this payo® is strictly greater than
W y;¤
m ; an average of the original point and r
00
n now shows that pn 2 An(T). Thus, we will
show that there exists a point of the form ¸0
nr0
n + (1 ¡ ¸0
n)pn against which the strategies in
T y
m are equally good replies and are at least as good a replies as those in ¹ T y
m. Suppose, to
the contrary, that this statement is not true. Then, letting Kn be the convex hull of pn and
P y
n(T y
n), we see that some strategy r¤
m with support contained in T y
m is weakly dominated
by another strategy ^ rm whose support is contained in T y
m [ ¹ T y
m when we restrict n to the
set Kn of strategies. Since all the strategies in T y
m [ ¹ T y
m yield the same payo® against which
qn, which belongs to the interior of, say, P y
n(¹ T y
n), the strategies r¤
m and ^ rm yield the same
payo® against every strategy in P y
n(¹ T y
n), since otherwise, r¤
m would not be dominated by ^ rm.
Therefore, by the genericity of the game, the strategies r¤
m and ^ rm induce the same outcome
against every strategy in P y
n(¹ T y
n). Consequently, any node x 2 Xm that is not excluded by
qn nor by either r¤
m or ^ rm, is enabled by the other as well and the actions prescribed by
behavioral strategies equivalent to these two agree at such a node. If x 2 Xm is node that
is excluded by qn, then it is enabled by (1 ¡ ¸n)pn + ¸nrn, since pn is completely mixed;
therefore, by weak sequential rationality of rm, if x is not excluded by r¤
m, then r¤
m prescribes
choices at x that are optimal against (1 ¡ ¸n)pn + ¸nrn. This implies that r¤
m is at least as
good a reply as ^ rm against qn(") for all ", which implies that it is not dominated by ^ rm as
claimed. Thus pn 2 An(T). ¤
Lemma A.5. Ay is a pseudo-manifold of dimension ly
m + ly
n.
Proof of Lemma. For each T, the dimension of Am(R) is lm + lm(T y
m) ¡ ln(T y
n) + 1; that
of An(T) is ln + ln(T y
n) ¡ lm(T y
m) ¡ 1, with the convention that lm(;) = ¡1. Hence the
dimension of Ay is ly
m + ly
n. We now prove the pseudo-manifold property. To prove this, it
is su±cient to show that for each T, each maximal face A0(T) of Am(T) £ An(T) belongs
either to @Ay or admits a decomposition into ¯nitely many polyhedra A1(T);:::;Ak(T) of
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exactly one other A(T 0). In fact the only sets A0(T) that we need to decompose are of the
form Am(T) £ (Bn(T) £ C0) where C0 is a maximal proper face of C(T). By Lemma A.2,
this set can be written as the union Am(T)£([T0Bn(T 0)£C0); each Am(T)£(Bn(T 0)£C0)
is a maximal proper face of Am(T 0) £ An(T 0).
Now if A0(T) is a maximal face of A(T), then either there exists a maximal proper face
A0
m(T) of Am(T) such that A0(T) = A0
m(T) £ An(T) or there exists a maximal proper face
A0
n(T) of An(T) such that A0(T) = Am(T) £ A0
n(T). Consider the former case. Here,
by Lemma A.3, for all (pm;qm) 2 Am(T) exactly one of the following inequalities hold: (i)
pm 2 @P y
m; (ii) there exists sn = 2 T y
n that is a best reply against qm; (iii) there exists a maximal
proper face of P y
m(T y
m) such that qm is a convex combination of pm and a point on this face.
In case (i), A0(T) belongs to @Ay and is not a face of any other A(T). In case (ii), letting T 0
n
be the set of pure strategies that belong to the minimal face of P y
n that is spanned by T y
n and
sn, and T 0 = (Tm;T 0
n), we have two possibilities: (a) Cn(T) = Cn(T 0); (b) Cn(T) ( Cn(T 0).
In the former case, Bn(T) is a maximal proper face of Bn(T 0) by property (iii) of Lemma A.1
and hence A0(T) is a maximal proper face of Am(T 0)£(Bn(T 0)£Cn(T)). In the latter case,
as we saw at the end of the last paragraph, A0(T) is a face of Am(T 0) £ (Bn(T 0) £ Cn(T 0)).
In case (iii), letting T 0 = (T 0
m;T y
n), where P y
m(T 0
m) is the maximal face we again have two
possibilities: (a) Cn(T) = Cn(T 0); (b) Cn(T) ( Cn(T 0). Under (a), the strategies in Tm nT 0
m
belong to ¹ T 0
m (the strategies other than those in T 0
m that are best replies against all strategies
in Cn(T 0)). Hence, Bn(T) is a maximal proper face of Bn(T 0) by property (ii) of Lemma
A.1, and A0(T) is a maximal proper face of Am(T 0)£An(T 0). Under case (b), the argument
is as under case (ii)(b).
In case A0(T) = Am(T)£A0
n(T) there are four possibilities: (i) pn belongs to the boundary
of P y
n; (ii) there exists a strategy sy
m 2 ¹ T y
m such that sy
m is as good a reply against every qn for
which (1¡¸)rn+¸qn belongs to B0
n(T); moreover, in this case, P y
m(T y
m) is a maximal proper
face of the smallest face of P y
m that includes the strategies T y
m and sm; (iii) for all points
pn ´ ¸qn +(1¡¸)rn, rn belongs to a maximal proper face Pn(T 0
n) and Cn(T 0) = Cn(T); (iv)
for all (pn;qn) in A0
n, qn belongs to a maximal proper face of Cn(T);
In case (i), A0(T) belongs to the boundary of Ay since its projection is to the boundary
of P y. In case (ii), let T 0
m be the set of pure strategies that are vertices of the smallest
face of P y
m that is spanned by T y
m and sm. Then A0(T) is a face of Am(T 0) £ An(T 0), where
T 0 = (T 0
m;Tn). In case (iii), A0(T) is a face of Am(T 0)£An(T 0) where T 0 = (T y
m;T 0
n). In case
(iv), the decomposition mentioned above applies: A0(T) is the union of subsets A0(T 0) ´
(Am(T)£Bn(T 0)£C0
n) for T 0 2 T , with each A0(T 0) being a subset of Am(T 0)£An(T 0). ¤
Lemma A.6. The projection ¼y from Ay to P y has degree one.36 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Proof of Lemma. We prove this lemma by showing that there exists an open subset U of
P y such that (¼y)
¡1(p) is a singleton for each p 2 U. Let b¤ be the backward induction
equilibrium of ¡y represented in behavioral strategies. Observe that the payo® to m from
the equilibrium b¤ in ¡y is strictly smaller than W y;¤
m , since in the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of ¡, player m avoids the subgame ¡y. By genericity of payo®s, there exists a small
neighborhood ¹ V of b¤ such that for each b in the subset V of ¹ V consisting of completely
mixed behavioral strategies, b¤ is the unique best reply and b¤
m yields strictly less than W y;¤
m
against every point in V . Let U be the subset of P yn@P y consisting of mixed strategies that
are equivalent to some behavioral strategy in V . Then U is an open subset of the interior
of P y. We claim now that for each p 2 U, (¼y)
¡1(p) = (p;q), where qm = pm and q¤
n is the
mixed strategy that is equivalent to b¤
n. To prove this, ¯x p 2 U and let q be a point such
that (p;q) 2 Ay. If qm = pm then obviously qn = q¤
n and we are done. Suppose qm 6= pm;
then there exists ¸ 2 (0;1) and rm such that qm = (1 ¡ ¸)pm + ¸rm and rm is a best reply
to qn and yields payo® W y;¤
m . We show in this case that rm = q¤
m and qn = q¤
n, which would
imply a contradiction because against b¤
n, the strategy b¤
m does not yield W y;¤
m . To prove this
last point, we show that if rm (resp. qn) does not exclude a node of player m (resp. n) then
the action prescribed by rm (resp. qn) there coincides with the backward induction solution.
The proof of this point is by backward induction on the tree. This is obviously true at all
end-game nodes. So let y0 be a node of one of the players that is not excluded by that player
and such that for all nodes following y0 our induction hypothesis holds. Suppose y0 is a node
of m (the other case is analogous). If y0 is excluded by qn then it is enabled by pn, which
is in the interior of P y
n, and by construction of U, the backward induction choice at y0 is
the response chosen by rm. If y0 is not excluded by qn then, by induction, qn prescribes the
same continuation as q¤
n. Thus, the beliefs of player m at y0 are that n's play is dictated
by some average of q¤
n and pn. By construction, the backward induction choice is the best
reply against either of those two strategies for player n. So, the induction hypothesis holds
at y0. ¤
This concludes the proof of the Proposition. ¤
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